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In delivering the 
Carruthers v Whitaker, 
ABSTRACT 
judgment 
(1975) , 
of the Court of Appeal in 
N. Z. L. R. 667, Richmond J 
expressed the view that when parties in negotiation for the sale and 
purchase of land instruct solicitors and contemplate the preparation of 
a formal agreement, the ordinary inference to be drawn is that they 
intend to contract only by means of the formal document signed by 
them both. 
The first part of this dissertation represents an attempt to 
define the bounds of Carruthers v Whitaker by reference to the 
earlier authorities as they are seen to apply to the situation in which 
parties who have reached an oral agreement as to terms contemplate 
the preparation of a formal document. It will be concluded that the 
Court of AppeaPs decision cannot be regarded as an authority on oral 
contracts generally: that its ambit is confined to those situations in 
which there has been no agreement as to the terms contained in the 
formal document or where execution of the formal document is 
intended by the parties to operate as a condition precedent to the 
formation of a concluded contract. Subsequent New Zealand 
decisions, it is submitted, are seen to support th is view. 
Carruthers v Whitaker, nevertheless, highlights the need for the 
plaintiff who seeks to rely on an oral contract to show clear evidence 
that the parties thereto intended to be bound. Moreover, in the light 
of recent English decisions it will be increasingly difficult to establish 
that certain non-contractual writings can amount to a sufficient 
memorandum to satisfy the statutory requirements. 
The latter part of this dissertation is devoted to the 
authenticated signature fiction, once again within the context of the 
i 
situation where a formal agreement is contemplated. It will be argue 
that Sturt v Mcinnes, (1974) 1 NZLR 729, which is regarded as 
having established the criteria for the fiction's application in 
New Zealand, should again be treated as an authority on Itwritten ll 
contracts alone and that to extend its application to post-contract 
memoranda would be contrary to the earlier authorities within which 
the doctrine is seen to have emerged. 
ii 
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INTRODUCTION 
Section 2 of the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956 has its origins 
in the Statute of Frauds 1677'. The fatter was stated in its preamble 
to be: an act II For prevention of many fraudulent practices which are 
commonly endeavoured to be upheld by perjury and subornation of 
perjury. 11 It contained some twenty-five sections dealing with such 
diverse topics as contract, real property and conveyancing, wills, 
trusts, administration of deceased estates, creditors! remedies, 
procedure and the law of succession2 The expressed purpose of the 
statute was carried out by those sections which made written or other 
adequate evidence necessary for certain transactions, of which those 
of the widest general appl ication were sections 4 and 17. For ease of 
reference the provisions of these sections are set out as follows: 
Section 4: 
No action shall be brought whereby to charge any executor or 
admin istrator upon any special promise to answer damages out of 
his own estate; or whereby to charge the defendant upon any 
special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of 
another person; or to charge any person upon any agreement 
made upon consideration of marriage; or upon any contract or 
sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any interest in or 
concerning them; or upon any agreement that is not to be 
performed within the space of one year from the making thereof; 
unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or 
some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing and signed 
by the party to be charged therewith or some other person 
thereunto by him lawfully authorised. 
1 For a detailed discussion of the background of the 
New Zealand provIsion see Article (Anon.) liThe Contracts 
Enforcement Act 1956 11 1956 32 N. Z. L. J. 305 and 321. 
2 For the history of the Statute of Frauds 1677 see 
W. S. Holdsworth II History of Eng /ish Law" Vol. 6 369-396. 
2 
Section 17: 
No contract for the sale of goods, wares or merchandise for the 
price of 10 (pounds) sterling or upwards shall be allowed to be 
good except the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold and 
actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind 
the bargain or in part payment, or that some note or memorandum 
in writing of the said bargain be made and signed by the parties 
to be charged by such contract or their agents thereunto lawfully 
authorised. 
Section 17 was later re-enacted in England as Section 4 of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1893 and subsequently repealed by the Law Reform 
(Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954. The provisions of section 4 of 
the Statute of Frauds, as they related to the sale or other disposition 
of land, now reappear, in modified form, as section 40 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925 (UK), which states: 
(1) No action may be brought upon any contract for the sale or 
other disposition of land or any interest in land, unless the 
agreement upon which such action is brought, or some 
memorandum or note thereof, is in writing, and signed by the 
party to be charged or by some other person thereunto lawfully 
authorised. 
(2) This section appl ies to contracts whether made before of after 
the commencement of this Act and does not affect the law relating 
to part performance, or sales by the court. 
I n New Zealand, section 17 was modified and re-enacted as 
section 6 of the Sale of Goods Act 1908, wh ich was subsequently 
repealed by section 4 of the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956. Section 
2 of the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956 was enacted in substitution 
for section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677; the latter section now 
having ceased to apply to contracts made after 19 October 1956. 
Section 2 of the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956, as it relates 
to contracts for the sale or disposition of land, provides: 
Proof of contracts relating to land ... (1) This section applies 
to -
(a) Every contract for the sale of land: 
3 
(b) Every contract to enter into any disposition of land, being 
a deposition that is required by any enactment to be made 
by deed or instrument or in writing or to be proved by 
writing: 
(c) Every contract to enter into any mortgage or charge on 
land: 
(2) No contract to which this section applies shall be enforceable 
by action unless the contract or some memorandum or note thereof 
is in writing and is signed by the party to be charged therewith 
or by some other person lawfully authorised by him. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall -
(a) Apply to any sale of land by order of the High Court or 
through the Registrar of that Court: 
(b) Apply to any alienation of Maori land ... 
(c) Affect the operation of the law relating to part 
performance. 
(4) For the purposes of this section, -
IDisposition' includes any conveyance, transfer, grant, partition, 
exchange, lease, assignment, surrender, disclaimer, appointment, 
settlement or other assurance •.. 
I Landi means any estate or interest, whether freehold or chattel, 
in real property. 
This dissertation focuses on aspects of the provisions 
contained in section 2 (2) of the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956 as 
they relate to contracts for the sale of land. In this respect the New 
Zealand provisions are equivalent to those contained in section 40(1) 
of the Law of Property Act 1925 (U.K.) and the section's 
predecessor, section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677. As the 
considerations involved in the appl ication of each section are 
identical, the writer has felt it unnecessary, in discussing the cases 
themselves, to identify the relevant provisions separately on the basis 
that this will be sufficiently indicated by the citations. As the 
requirements as to writing are expressed in similar terms in section 
17 of the Statute of Frauds 1677, the earlier authorities on that 
4 
section and its subsequent restatements continue to retain some 
relevance in this context. 
The provisions of section 2 (2) of the Contracts Enforcement 
Act 1956 and their counterparts have given rise to a vast structure 
of case law, an extensive survey of which would be beyond the 
ambits of the present dissertation. Conspicuously, no attempt has 
been made to examine such topics as the contents of the memorandum, 
the joinder of documents, variation and waiver and the effects of 
non-compliance with the statutory provisions, as the writer considers 
that such matters are adequately dealt with in most of the standard 
texts. Neither has it been sought to examine the merits of the 
legislation or views to possible reform. In fact this dissertation is 
primari Iy concerned with a question which is, in reality, independent 
of the Act, namely the circumstances in which a "contract" will be 
found to exist. 
Section 2 (2) of the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956 provides 
that no contract to which it applies shall be enforceable unless the 
contract or some memorandum or note thereof is in writing and is 
signed by the party to be charged. It is said that the statutory 
requirement "was not meant to affect contracts in any way, but only 
the evidence of them"3 . While a II written contractli will clearly satisfy 
the statutory requirements, the section presupposes that the contract 
sought to be enforced may be an oral contract so long as a sufficient 
note or memorandum exists and that the writing relied upon in that 
instance need not be contractual in itself. These principles are so 
3Bristol Cardiff & Swansea Aerated Bread Co. v Maggs (1890) 
44 Ch.D. 616 per Kay J, 622. 
5 
fundamental that it may be thought that they do not warrant 
restating, however ,over recent years the distinction between "ora ltl 
and "written ll contracts appears to have become somewhat blurred, 
particularly where, as in most sales of land in New Zealand, 
negotiations culminate in the preparation of a formal agreement. 
The practical difficulty is seen to arise in that while parties in 
New Zealand may have agreed on the sale and purchase of land; 
(they may have reached a concensus upon all material terms and may 
have II s haken hands ll upon their bargain) they will invariably instruct 
sol icitors to attend to the conveyancing aspects of the transaction. 
At this point, if a formal written agreement has not already been 
prepared, it almost invariably will be (solicitors being aware of the 
provisions of section 2 of the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956 even if 
some laymen are not). But at what point and in what manner do the 
parties intend to become bound? Theoreticalfy, this question should 
be determined objectively: by enquiring how the reasonable 
bystander would have understood the parties' words and conduct. 
However, in 1975 the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Carruthers v 
Whitaker 4 expressed the view that "When parties ... act in this way" 
then the ordinary, indeed the prima facie inference to be drawn is 
that they do not intend to be bound until the formal written document 
5 has been executed by them both. The Court of Appeal later 
endorsed its decision in Carruthers v Whitaker5a in Concorde 
Enterprises Ltd v Anthony Motors (Hutt) Ltd6 . 
4 [1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 667 
Sid 671 5aSupra note 4 
6 [1981] 2 N.Z.L.R. 385 
6 
Where parties who have reached an oral agreement as to terms 
contemplate the preparation of a formal document, the preparation and 
execution of that document may normally be viewed in one of three 
ways: It may be treated as either a condition precedent to the 
formation of a concluded agreement, a condition precedent to the 
contract's performance or, alternatively, as no more than a matter of 
7 form. In the first part of this dissertation the writer will endeavour 
to expand and illustrate this traditional analysis and to provide an 
indication of the types of factors which will be relevant in 
determining the particular category into which a given situation will 
fall. It will become apparent at the outset that it is impossible to lay 
down any hard and fast rules and that such guidelines as there are, 
are seen to emerge only by means of an analysis of the cases. 
Finally, it will be sought to examine the decision in Carruthers v 
Whitaker8 itself and those cases which have followed in its wake. By 
way of conclusion it will be argued that Carruthers v Whitaker9 must 
be regarded as an authority on written contracts alone; that in fact 
any wider interpretation of the Court of Appeal's decision can be 
justified by neither principle nor on the basis of the earl ier 
authorities. 
The second part of this dissertation is devoted to what is 
termed the "authenticated signature fiction" with reference to the 
71nfra 25, 26 
8Supra note 4. 
9 Supra note 4. 
7 
criteria for the doctrine's application formulated by Wilson J in Sturt 
v Mcinnes 10. The writer will again seek to emphasise that before one 
can consider the requirements of the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956 
at all, it is essential to determine if and at what point a contract can 
be said to exist. Where parties contemplate the preparation of a 
formal document, their intention as to the effect of that document 
remains crucial. The writer will endeavour to illustrate by an 
analysis of the earlier authorities that while the criteria laid down in 
11 Sturt v Mcinnes may be said to apply where parties intend to be 
bound by means of a written contract, they cannot be treated as 
definitive where the writing relied on is in fact a memorandum of an 
existing agreement. 
PART ONE - THE AMBIT OF CARRUTHERS V WHITAKER 
I. INTENTION GENERALLY 
In Cheshire and Fifoot's "Law of Contract", with reference to 
12 
what is termed the "phenomenon of agreement", the authors state : 
An offer, capable of being converted into an agreement by 
acceptance, must consist of a definite promise to be bound 
provided that certain specified terms are accepted. The offeror 
must have completed his share in the formation of a contract by 
finally declaring his readiness to undertake an obligation on 
certain conditions, leaving to the offeree the option of acceptance 
or refusal. He must not merely have been feel ing h is way 
towards an agreement, not merely initiating negotiations from 
which an agreement might or might not in time result. He must 
be prepared to implement his promise, if such is the wish of the 
other party. 
The requirements for the formation of a valid contract, 
therefore, are firstly, that there must be a contractural offer and, 
10[1974] 1 N.Z.L.R. 729 
l1 1bid 
12Cheshire and Fifoot's IILaw of Contract" (6th N.Z. Edition ed 
J. F. Northey), 26 
8 
secondly, an acceptance which is final and unconditional in its terms. 
I n the context of agreements for the sale and purchase of land it is 
necessary to determine at what point parties cease to be merely in 
negotiation and intend instead to enter into a contractual relationship. 
In th is respect, the courts will require cogent evidence of an 
intention to be bound. 
In determining the parties ' intention, it is well established that 
the test to be applied is an objective one. Thus, whether an oral 
contract can be said to exist will depend upon the effect which the 
parties
' 
conduct and words would have had upon a reasonable 
bystander. Where it is alleged that a written document constitutes 
either an offer or an acceptance, the principles remain the same, the 
test being the effect which the language used by the defendant, on 
its true construction, might reasonably have had upon the mind of 
the recipient. 
The question of whether a concluded contract resulted from an 
exchange of correspondence was recently considered by the 
New Zealand Court of Appear in Boulder Consolidated Ltd v 
13 Tangaere Cooke J endorsed as the traditional approach that 
d t d b L d Do I k ° GOb M h Co C °1 14 hO h a op e y or I p oc In I son v anc ester Ity ounci w IC 
involved IIlooking at the ... documents rei ied on as constituting the 
contract sued on and seeing whether, on their true construction, 
there is to be found in them a contractural offer 
/ 
to sell ... and 
15 
an acceptance of that offer" . 
13[1980] N.Z.L.R. 560 
14[1979] 1 All E.R. 972 
15 id • 974 
Cooke J found that it was possible to 
9 
adopt as an alternative the test whether "viewed as a whole and 
objectively, the correspondence shows a concluded agreementu16 . 
This approach he found had been indicated by Lord Wilberforce in 
New Zealand Shipping CoUd v A M Satherwaite & Co Ltd 17 and in 
Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon (Australia) 
Pty Ltd 18 and was sometimes more rewarding than a mechanical 
analysis in terms of offer and acceptance. However, on either 
approach lithe point of view of the reasonable man in the shoes of the 
recipient of each letter is of major importance,,19. 
Determining the intention of the parties may often prove most 
difficult in situations where the preparation of a formal agreement is 
contemplated. In some situations correspondence or other informal 
writings relied on as constituting either a written contract or a 
memorandum of an existing oral contract may make express reference 
to the preparation of a formal document. In other cases, parties may 
agree verbally on essential terms, but may also agree either that the 
terms shall be recorded in a formal document or that the matter shall 
be referred to their solicitors with the effect, if not the expressed 
intention, that a formal document will afterwards be prepared. In 
these situations, the question of the parties' "intention" is seen to 
acquire an additional aspect in so far as it becomes necessary to 
consider not only whether the parties intend to enter into a 
contractual relationship in the broad sense but also the time at which 
16 Supra note 13 at p 363 
17 [1974] 1 N.Z.L.R. 505 
18[1980] 3 All E.R. 257 
19 Supra note 16 
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and the manner in which they intend to be bound. In the words of 
Lord Greene M R in Eccles v Bryant20 IIWhen parties are proposing to 
enter into a contract, the manner in which the contract is to be 
created so as to bind them must be gathered from the intentions of 
the parties, express or implied. 1I21 
Although the parties' intention is to be determined upon an 
objective analysis, regardless of whether a plaintiff seeks to establish 
an "oral" or a II wr itten U contract, the types of evidence available in 
aid of the court's enquiry will differ in each case. Where the writing 
relied on by the plaintiff is alleged to constitute a IIwritten II contract, 
it must reveal as a matter of construction that the parties thereto 
intended to be bound. The court's investigation is limited to 
construing the language which the parties chose to use and parol or 
22 
other extrinsic evidence will generally be inadmissible to assist in 
the interpretation of the document or to contradict, vary or add to 
the terms which it contains23 . 
2°[19481 Ch. 93 
21 id . 97 
22This is so regardless of whether the exclusion is seen to 
result from the provision in section 2(2) of the Contracts Enforcement 
Act 1956 itself or by virtue of the parol evidence rule. 
23 Parol evidence may be admissible in other circumstances, for 
instance to establish a collateral agreement, variation or discharge of 
the written agreement or invalidity due to fraud, duress or mistake. 
I n this context, the provisions of the Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 
should be noted and the Court of Appeal decision in Conlon v 
Ozolins, [19841 1 N.Z.L.R. 489, where the plaintiff was able, in 
effect, to plead her own subjective error, unknown to the other 
party, as a ground for relief. 
11 
It would now appear to be accepted, however, that in 
determining the intention which the language in a written contract 
reveals, or the meaning to be attributed to particular terms, the 
words used by the parties cannot be viewed in the abstract and 
regard may also be had to the surrounding circumstances and the 
factual setting in which they were used24 . Moreover, where the 
language itself or its application to the facts is ambiguous, and this 
may be particularly so in relation to informal writings, evidence may 
also be given as to the conduct of the parties preceding the 
transaction, its relevant background and the facts and objects in the 
parties' joint contemplation at the time25 . 
Where the plaintiff seeks to establish an "oral" contract, the 
writing relied upon as constituting a sufficient memorandum must 
record all the material terms of the parties' agreement and by virtue 
of the statute, parol evidence is simifarly inadmissible to contradict 
vary or add to those terms. But although in the case of oral 
contracts the matter of the parties' intention must again be 
determined objectively, the court's sphere of enquiry in this context 
is much less restricted. In addition to the parties' words and 
conduct and although direct testimony of intention and evidence of 
24The approach now adopted in relation to terms appears to be 
that expounded by Lord Wilberforce in Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 3 All 
E.R. 237 (H.L.) and Reardon-Smith Line v Hansen-Tangen [1976] 3 
All E. R. 570 (H. L.). The same approach should apply in determining 
the intention which the language reveals. This was the view of the 
High Court of Australia in Allen v Carbone (1975) 132 C.L.R. 528, 
531-532 and of Hardie Boys JIrlthe unreported case of Riley v Jones 
where he stated 11 [W]here it is necessary to ascertain the intention of 
a party to a contract ... the Court must look at the language which 
is being used ... the language must of course be considered against 
the relevant factual background". 
251lPhipson on Evidence" (13d), 980-982 
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subsequent conduct ought again, strictly speaking, to be excluded it 
woud seem that virtually any and all other evidence which is relevant 
will be admissible. Where the parties have not expressed the terms 
of their agreement in detail, their intention, both as to the time at 
which and the manner in which a contract will be created so as to 
bind them, lends itself more readily to determination by inference 
having regard to the nature of the parties, the nature of the 
transaction and the background evidence as a whole26 . 
II. THE "SUBJECT TO CONTRACT" CASES 
It is accepted at the outset that the expression "subject to 
contract" which has become more or less a term of legal art in 
England is not in common usage in New Zealand. Some reference is 
made, however, to the large volume of English cases on th is topic for 
three reasons: Firstly, because in New Zealand, in cases concerning 
the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956 it is frequently sought to draw 
analogies with the IIsubject to contract lf formula, secondly, because 
the extent to which the principles surrounding the use of the formula 
in England have been developed and expanded over recent years has, 
it is submitted, affected to some extent the attitude of the 
New Zealand courts and, thirdly, because it is within this context 
that the English Court of Appeal decision in Tiverton Estates Ltd v 
27 Wearwell Ltd emerged which must now be seen to affect generally all 
contracts to wh ich section 2 of the Act appl ies. 
26Allen v Carbone (1975) 132 C.L.R. 528, 531-533 
27[1975] Ch 146 
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Where the words IIsubject to contract" are used by the parties 
in their negotiations, in a receipt for a deposit or in correspondence 
passing between them or their solicitors, their effect is that neither 
party to the arrangement is legally bound until the terms of their 
agreement have been embodied in a formal contract signed by them 
both. Winn v BU1l 28 , decided in 1877, is regarded as one of the 
earliest statements of this principle which has since been consistently 
applied. 29 In 1948, in the case of Eccles v Bryant , the principle was 
endorsed by a strong Court of Appeal (Lord Greene M R, Cohen and 
Asquith LJJ) and extended, with the effect that in England, where 
parties enter into an arrangement "subject to contract", the contract 
is not complete until signed copies of the agreement are "exchanged" 
in accordance with English conveyancing practice. 
It is said that where parties use the "subject to contract" 
formula they normally do so either because they anticipate that the 
terms of their arrangement may be later supplemented or modified or 
simply because they wish to reserve to themselves the right to 
withdraw up until the time at which formal contracts are signed and 
exchanged30 . With regard to the latter, it is often said31 that the 
"subject to contract" usage initially developed to protect a purchaser 
from the consequences of entering into an 1I0pen contract" (Le. an 
28(1877) 7 Ch.D. 29 
29[1948] Ch. 93 
30Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 C.L.R. 353, 361; Rossiter v 
Miller (1878) 3 App. Cas. 1124 per Lord O'Hagan, 115 per 
Lord Blackburn, 1152. 
31 E. q . R.W. Clark IISubject to Contract - 1 English Problems 
(1984) 48 Conv. (N.S.) 173,183; Law Commission (U.K.) Report on 
rrSubject to Contract" Agreements (Law Com. No. 65); Mulhall v 
Haren [1981] I.R. 364,375. 
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agreement with respect to parties, subject-matter and price alone). 
This was, and to some extent still is, fraught with particular risks in 
England where a large proportion of land remains unregistered and 
where it is frequently necessary for a purchaser to make enquiries 
and stipulations as to title. 
By the mid 1900's, the meaning of the phrase had become 
I t Ot tObl 32 h th I 1970' ° E I d amos mcon raver Ie, owever, e ear y s m ng an saw 
an unprecedented rise in the value of real property. A vendor who 
had agreed verbally on the sale of a property was frequently faced 
with a higher offer within days or even hours and the temptation to 
resile from an earlier bargain in such cases was strong. The 
"subject to contract" formula, initially adopted for the protection of 
the purchaser, often provided the means. It was, therefore, not 
surprising that attempts were made to escape or restrict its 
appl ication. 
Two cases which drew considerable controversy in England, 
were the English Court of Appeal decisions in Griffiths v Young 33 
and Law v Jones34 . The facts in Griffiths v Young 35 , briefly stated, 
were as fol lows: 
32 Sut cf Michael Richards Properties Ltd v St Saviours Parish, 
Southwark, Corporation of Wardens [1975] 3 All E.R. 416 and more 
recently, Alpenstow Ltd v Regalian Properties pIc [1985] 2 All E.R. 
545 where the words "subject to contract" were not accorded their 
prima facie meaning on the basis that the phrase was wholly 
inapposite in the context in which it was used. However, in each 
case it was emphasised that the facts were "strong and exceptional" 
and that similar situations would be rare. See also the recent Irish 
decision referred to, infra 
33[1970J Ch. 675 
34[1974J Ch 112 
35 Supra note 33 
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The parties were both substantial land owners and had had 
business dealings with one another previously. The defendant was 
temporarily short of funds and approached the plaintiff with a view to 
the plaintiff's guaranteeing a bank overdraft in the defendant's 
favour. The plaintiff had for some time wished to acquire a portion 
of the defendant's lands which the defendant, up until then, had 
been unwilling to part with. It was agreed that the plaintiff would 
provide the guarantee and that in return the defendant would sell him 
the lands. Settlement was not to take place immediately but was to 
be arranged upon the basis that if the plaintiff were required to 
honour his obligations under the guarantee he would receive a 
reduction in the agreed purchase price to the extent of his liability. 
The details of the transaction having been discussed and fully 
agreed upon, both parties approached their sol icitors so that the 
arrangement could be put into effect. The plaintiff's solicitor then 
wrote to the defendant's solicitor, correctly setting forth the 
agreement in all its terms, but expressing the purchase price for the 
lands as being "subject to contract". The parties themselves then 
discussed the progress of the matter, the defendant re-emphasising 
his financial plight and expressing some concern as to the time it 
might take to finalise the transaction. In the words of the plaintiff, 
the defendant had at that point said to him "we had had a bargain 
and he couldn't see why I did not get on and sign it". The plaintiff 
agreed to contact his solicitor to see what could be done and, as a 
result, the plaintiff's solicitor telephoned the solicitor acting for the 
defendant. The plaintiff's solicitor's evidence, which was accepted by 
the Court, was that h is object in telephoning was to point out that if 
the defendant was to have his guarantee at once, there must be a 
binding contract for sale at once and that h is own letter, wh ich 
16 
referred to the arrangement as being IIsubject to contract" must to 
that extent be treated as amended. The defendant's sol icitor 
consulted his client then wrote to the plaintiff's solicitor. referring to 
the earlier letter, and confirming the defendant's instructions to sell 
at the agreed price. The guarantee was subsequently given. but the 
defendant refused to take steps towards completion. 
The Court of Appeal (Russell, Widgery and Cross LJJ) found 
for the plaintiff on the basis that there was an oral contract and that 
the second letter, referring as it did to the first, could be read 
together with it so providing a sufficient memorandum of the terms. 
It was argued for the defendant that the letters could not constitute 
a valid memorandum because of the inclusion of the words "subject to 
contract" which were indicative not of a concluded contract but of "an 
arrangement not yet blossoming into full contractual status u36 • It 
was argued that the decision in Societe Capa Societe a Responsabilite 
Limitee v Acatos &Co Ltd (InVoluntary 
reference was made to Thirkell v Cambi38 , was authority for the 
proposition that a memorandum must contain not only the terms of the 
contract, but a recognition that the contract was in fact made. 
Widgery LJ confessed to having had some difficulty upon the point 
but concluded that the cases cited by the defendant ought to be 
distinguished. They were of the "confession and avoidance" type 
(which frequently arose under the analogous provisions of Section 4 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1893) and it was in those cases only, where 
the memorandum denied liability, that a recognition of the contract 
36Supra note 33 at p 683 
37 [1953] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 185 
38[1919] 2 K.B. 590 (C.A.) 
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itself was required in addition to a recital of its terms. By contrast, 
the phrase "subject to contract II was merely "a suspensory provision li 
which on the oral evidence had been waived. 
Russell and Cross LJJ found that in the course of the 
telephone conversation, the plaintiff's solicitor had made on behalf of 
his client an unconditional offer which was accepted by the 
subsequent letter written by the defendant's solicitor. The phrase 
"subject to contract" in the first letter was merely a suspensory 
provision which existed prior to the formation of the concluded 
contract. The qualification had been expressly waived and the 
contract thereby brought into force. The cases referred to by the 
defendant did not touch this kind of situation at all. 
I n Law v Jones39 , which came before the court some three 
years later, the parties orally agreed on the sale of the defendant's 
house property to the plaintiff for a specified price. The parties 
shook hands upon their agreement. However, in subsequent 
correspondence with the plaintiff's solicitor, the defendant's solicitor 
again referred to t~e arrangement as being "subject to contract". He 
spoke of the plaintiff's "proposed purchase" from his client and 
indicated that he would forward a draft contract for approval. Some 
time later, the parties met again and the defendant managed to 
extract the plaintiff's agreement to an increased price of. He said at 
the time "I shalf not go back on my word. My word is my bond. It 
is yours now: carryon and make all your arrangements." 
Accordingly, the defendant's solicitors wrote again to the plaintiff's 
solicitors, recording the agreement as to the increased price and 
asking the plaintiff's solicitors to amend the draft contract by then in 
39 Supra note 34 
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their possession. The letter did not contain the words "subject to 
contract" . In the hope of obtaining a higher price still, the 
defendant subsequently decided to put the property up for auction. 
Buckley and Orr LJJ found for the plaintiff, again on the 
basis of an oral contract of which the correspondence and draft 
agreement provided a sufficient memorandum. While they were 
prepared to accept that a document which denied the existence of a 
contract could not be a sufficient memorandum, the words "subject to 
40 
contract", on the authority of Griffiths v Young , were not to be 
treated as a denial but merely as imposing a suspensive condition. 
The words "proposed purchase" were inconclusive. Both judges held 
that it was not necessary to find in the memorandum any positive 
admission of a contract save in cases where the document itself 
contained a denial of liability which could, but for the admission, be 
read as embracing a denial of the existence of the alleged contract. 
In the words of Buckley LJ, "It is not the fact of agreement but the 
terms agreed upon that must be found recorded in writing,,41. He 
found support for his view in the fact that it was well established 
-~that a written offer would amount to a sufficient memorandum, even if 
accepted orally. In these cases, the writing clearly could not 
acknowledge a contract eXisting at the time of writing. In the instant 
case, the parties' agreement as to the increased price amounted to an 
entirely new contract. When the defendant's solicitor wrote to the 
plaintiff's solicitor requesting the amendment to the contract price, he 
40 Supra note 33 
41 Supra note 34 at p 124 
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thereby acknowledged the new contract which was not expressed to 
be "subject to contract". Alternatively, if the initial inclusion of the 
words "subject to contract ll was seen as qualifying all the subsequent 
correspondence, then this qualification was eliminated at the time and 
by virtue of the new agreement. 
Russell LJ on this occasion found himself in the minority. 
While he accepted the existence of an oral contract for sale at the 
increased price, he found that the documents rei ied upon could not 
constitute a valid memorandum. The language of the first letter 
referring as it did to IIproposed purchase", the preparation of a draft 
contract and expressing the arrangement to be IIsubject to contractU, 
clearly negatived the existence of a contract and indicated that the 
parties were merely in negotiation. The subsequent letter was 
written as part of a chain of writings dependent on the first and 
could not be treated as indicating anything more than an agreed 
variation as to price. 
Although he found it unnecessary to decide the point, 
Russell LJ thought that there was much to be said for the proposition 
that the memorandum after an oral contract should point in some way 
to the pre-existence of a concluded bargain. He thought that the 
offer cases were to be explained on the ground IIthat the writing in 
its terms envisages a contract, is a proposal of an agreement, is 
regarded as continuously in existence, and is ultimately simultaneous 
with the formation of the contract ll42 • Finally, he referred to the 
fact that the argument for the plaintiff had been based on the 
decision in Griffiths v Young 43. The grounds for that decision, 
42 Supra note 34 at p 118-121 
43 Supra note 33 
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however, clearly demonstrated that it did not assist the plaintiff in 
the present case. 
Some months later, the Court of Appeal was faced with a 
similar fact situation in Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd44 . The 
court on that occasion (Lord Denning M.R., Stamp and Scarman LJJ) 
unanimously held that a memorandum to satisfy the statutory 
requirements, must contain an express or implied recognition that a 
contract had been entered into. 
The facts in the Tiverton Estate 45 case were that an oral 
agreement for the sale and purchase of a leasehold property had been 
reached between directors of the plaintiff - vendor and defendant -
purchaser companies. The two directors shook hands with one 
another at the conclusion of their meeting and agreed to instruct 
their solicitors to confirm the sale. Once again the correspondence 
issuing forth from the defendant's solicitor expressed the arrangement 
to be "subject to contract II , referred to "the proposed sale" and 
requested that the plaintiff's solicitors forward lithe draft contract for 
approval". On the same day, the plaintiff's director telephoned his 
opposite number and subsequently wrote to the defendant company 
recording that the defendant had agreed that completion could take 
place as soon as possible. The plaintiff's solicitors then wrote to the 
defendant's solicitors referring to the correspondence from the latter 
and enclosing "draft contract for approval". The plaintiff decided 
not to proceed with the sale and the defendant lodged a caution in 
the Land Registry. On an appl ication by the plaintiffs, the caution 
was cancelled. The defendants appealed . 
44[1975] Ch. 146 
45Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd, Ibid 
case 
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The Court of Appeal, after embarking upon an analysis of the 
law 46, found that of the cases cited to it, in none of them 
decided prior to 1970 had it been decided that a memorandum which 
did not acknowledge that the signatory to it had entered into a 
contract, was a sufficient memorandum. The confession and avoidance 
cases decided not that a recognition of the contract was a necessary 
requirement only because the memorandum denied liability, but rather 
that provided the memorandum satisfied the statutory requirements, it 
was irrelevant that for one reason or another, the memorandum denied 
the liability of the party charged. Furthermore, the necessity for 
the memorandum to acknowledge a concluded contract was implicit in 
the judgment in Re le47 which was not a confession and avoidance 
----!-
case. 
Their Lordships agreed with Russell LJ's analysis of the offer 
cases in Law v Jones 48, Lord Denning adding that a further factor in 
the emergence of the principles had been that prior to the 
development of the doctrine of part-performance, written offers were 
frequently accepted by conduct in situations where it would have 
been unjust to prevent the offeree from enforcing the contract. 
Although it was well settled that a written offer, once accepted 
orally, would amount to a sufficient memorandum, it was equally clear 
that the offer cases had pushed the literal construction of the statute 
to a limit beyond which it was not easy to go. 
46Bailey v Sweeting (1861) 9 C.B.N.S. 843; Wilkinson v Evans 
(1866) L.R. 1 C.P. 407; Buxton v Rust (1872) 
Thirkell v Cambi [1919} 2 K.B.591}; Societe Capa Societe a 
Responsabilite Limitee v Acatos & Co Ltd (In Voluntary liquidation) 
[1953] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 185; Re Hoyle [1893] 1 Ch. 84 
47[189311 Ch. 84 
48 Supra note 34 
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Their Lordships found that the majority in Law v Jones 49 had 
relied upon the offer cases as supporting the principle that a 
memorandum need not record the fact of agreement, but only the 
terms thereof. They had, therefore, been led to the conclusion that 
the words "subject to contract" were not to be treated as a denial of 
the contract but only as imposing a suspensive condition, the waiver 
of which could be established by oral evidence. The decision, 
therefore, removed all protection from parties who used the "subject 
to contract" formula which for more than one hundred years had been 
held to mean that the matter remained in negotiation until a formal 
contract was executed. 
Lord Denning found it was impossible to distinguish "between a 
writing which (i) denies there was any contract; (ii) does not admit 
there was any contract; (iii) says that the parties are in negotiation; 
or (iv) says that there was an agreement "subject to contractll for 
that comes to the same thing. The reason why none of these writings 
satisfies the statute is because none of them contains any recogn ition 
or admission of the existence of the contract. 11 50 
In the instant case, their Lordships found that the writings 
relied upon clearly denied the existence of a contract. 51 Law v Jones 
ran contrary to earlier decisions of equal authority as did Griffiths v 
52 Young to the extent to which it was implicit in that decision that a 
memorandum need not recognise the existence of a contract. It was 
49 1bid 
50 Supra note 44 at p 160 
51 Supra note 34 
52 Supra note 33 
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accepted, however, that the decision in Griffiths v Young 53 could be 
justified upon other grounds. Being faced, therefore, with two lines 
of conflicting authority, the Court was entitled to prefer the earlier 
cases cited and to decline to follow the decision in Law v Jones54 . 
It should be noted that Buckley and Orr LJJ took the first 
available opportunity55 to reaffirm the views he had expressed in Law 
56 
v Jones . The conflict between the two Court of Appeal decisions, 
therefore, remains str ictly undecided, however, the courts in 
England, in subsequent cases, have preferred the decision in 
Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd57 . It now appears to be well 
settled in England that the memorandum relied upon must expressly or 
impliedly recognise the existence of a contract and that the presence 
of the words "subject to contractU, even though they are inserted 
without authority, will almost invariably prevent the writing from 
satisfying the statutory requirements58 . 
Subsequent Engl ish decisions have indicated that even if the 
"subject to contractU formula is inserted on Iy at the commencement of 
negotiations, its qualifying effect will usually extend to all subsequent 
53 1bid 
54 Supra note 34 
55Daulia Ltd v Four Millbank Nominees Ltd [1978J Ch. 231, per 
Buckely L. J. 249-251, and per Orr L.J. 251 
56Supra note 34 
57 Supra note 44 
58E. g . Munton v Greater London Council [1976J 2 All E.R. 815 
(C.A.) and Duttons Brewery Ltd v Leeds City Council (1982) 261 
E.G. 885 (both concerning agreements as to compulsory purchase); 
Tevanan v Norman Brett (Builders) Ltd (1972) 223 E.G. 1945; 
Sherbrooke v Dipple (1980) 255 E.G. 1203 (C.A.) and in Ireland, 
Mulhall v Haren [1981] I.R. 364 
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communications between the parties. This will apply even where 
initial "subject to contract" negotiations have broken down and the 
parties then discuss and appear to arrive at a fresh agreement after 
a lapse of some months59 . All the negotiations will be treated as 
remaining under the lI umbrella" of the "subject to contract" formula 
unless both parties expressly agree that the qualification should be 
d h t t °1 b . 1° d 60 expunge or suc an agreemen mus necessarl y e Imp Ie • 
There remains to be said one final word regarding Griffiths v 
61 Young . The Court of Appeal in the Tiverton Estates62 case 
---------
declined to follow the decision to the extent that it held that a 
memorandum need not recognise the existence of the contract, but 
found that it could be supported upon other grounds for, as Stamp 
LJ said, he could "well understand that when, as there, a letter is 
written which otherwise satisfies the statute and which does 
unequivocally recognise an unconditional oral contract made that day, 
you may refer to an earlier letter written "subject to contract" and 
referred to in the memorandum, for the purposes of ascertaining the 
terms,,63. It will be recalled that in Griffiths v Young64 the "second 
letter" was made in response to the unconditional verbal offer made 
by the plaintiff's solicitor in the course of the telephone conversation. 
59Tevanan v Norman Brett (Builders) Ltd (1972) 223 E.G. 
1945; Sherbrooke v Dipple 1980 (255) E.G. 1203 (C.A.); Cohen v 
Nessdale Ltd [1981] 3 All E.R. 118 affirmed on appeal [1982] 2 All 
E. R. 97 
60Tevanan v Norman Brett 
61 Supra note 33 
Ltd supra note 59 
62Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd [1975] Ch. 146 
63 id 169 
64 Supra note 33 
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It amounted to an acceptance of that offer and by so doing, and in 
recording the defendant's instructions to sell, it clearly admitted and 
recognised the existence of the oral contract. The distinction, as 
was pointed out by Russell LJ in Griffiths v Young65 and in his 
dissenting judgment in Law v Jones 66 is between, on the one hand, , 
--
a condition which exists prior to the formation of a contract, the 
waiver or removal of which in itself brings the contract into 
existence, and, on the other, a condition which is inserted in a 
post-contract memorandum, thereby denying or pointing away from 
the existence of a contract. 
III. REFERENCE TO THE FORMAL DOCUMENT CONTAINED IN THE 
WRITING RELIED UPON 
1. Introduction 
Where parties in negotiation for the sale of land agree upon 
the preparation of a formal document or where the writing relied upon 
as constituting a memorandum makes reference to the preparation of a 
formal document, the parties' words may be interpreted in anyone of 
three ways. One of the earl iest expressions of this proposition is 
again to be found in Winn v Bull where Sir George Jesser M R 
stated67 : 
65Supra note 33 at p 686-687 
66Supra note 34 at p 121 
67[1877] 7 Ch. 29, 32 
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Where you have a proposal or agreement made in writing 
expressed to be subject to a contract being prepared, it means 
what it- says: it is subject to and dependent upon a formal 
contract being prepared. When it is not expressly stated to be 
subject to a formal contract it becomes a question of construction 
whether the parties intended that the terms agreed on should 
merely be put into form, or whether they should be subject to a 
new agreement, the terms of which are not expressed in detail. 
The statement envisages that the reference to the formal 
document may be found to be either a condition precedent to the 
formation of the contract itself, or a condition precedent to its 
performance (i.e. a condition subsequent) or an expression of a mere 
desire as to the final form which the parties' already concluded 
bargain should ultimately take. More recently, the High Court of 
Australia in Masters v Cameron restated the proposition in the 
following way68: 
Where parties who have been in negotiation reach agreement upon 
terms of a contractual nature and also agree that the matter of 
their negotiation shall be dealt with by a formal contract, the 
case may belong to anyone of three classes. It may be one in 
which the parties have reached finality in arranging all the terms 
of their bargain and intend to be immediately bound to the 
performance of those terms, but at the same time propose to have 
the terms restated in a form which will be fuller or more precise 
but not different in effect. Or, secondly, it may be a case in 
which the parties have completely agreed upon all the terms of 
their bargain and intend no departure from or addition to that 
which their agreed terms express or imply, but nevertheless have 
made performance of one or more of the terms conditional upon 
the execution of a formal document. Or, thirdly, the case may 
be one in which the intention of the parties is not to make a 
concluded bargain at all, unless and until they execute a formal 
contract. 
2. Condition Precedent or Subsequent 
The "subject to contract" cases, already discussed, fall 
automatically into the third category of the Masters v Cameron69 
68(1954) 91 C.L.R. 353, 360 
69(1954) 91 C.L.R. 353 
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trichotomy. In fact, as the statement of Jesse" MR in Winn v Bull 70 
clearly indicates and as subsequent cases reveal, the fact that the 
reference to the formal document is worded as a condition is almost 
invariably conclusive against its being treated as a mere expression of 
the parties' desire. The use of the words "subject to" is seen to 
give rise almost to a presumption in favour of the parties remaining 
in negotiation until the formal agreement is prepared and executed. 
Where the reference is found to import a condition there is no 
concluded contract because, as Parker J succinctly stated in Van 
Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg v Alexander "either the cond ition is 
unfulfilled or because the law does not recognise a contract to enter 
into a contract ll71 • In that case the plaintiff sought to establish a 
written contract consisting of correspondence which had passed 
between the parties' land agents. The letter alleged to constitute the 
defendant's acceptance recorded that her agents were instructed to 
accept the plaintiff's offer, but continued: 
subject to the following conditions (1) 
"This acceptance is 
(2) that Her Serene 
Highness's solicitors approve the title to, and covenants contained in 
the lease, the title from the freeholder and the form of contract 
It was held that the letters did not constitute a binding contract. 
II 
A similar result was achieved in Masters v Cameron 72 itself 
where the memorandum relied upon contained the words "This 
agreement is made subject to the preparation of a formal contract of 
sale ... II 
70(1877) 7 Ch.D. 29 
71[1912] 1 Ch. 284,289 
72 Supra note 69 
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So too in the subsequent Australian case of Bridle Estates Pty 
Ltd v Myer Realty Ltd 73 , the directors of the defendant company had 
signed a document which was delivered to the plaintiff in which it was 
stated that the defendant would consider an offer by the plaintiff to 
purchase certain blocks of land upon specified terms IIsubject always 
to preparation and execution of a formal contract of sale ll . The High 
Court of Australia (Barwick C.J., Jacobs & Aiken JJ) held that the 
stipulation governed the parties' negotiations so that the plaintiff's 
verbal acquiesce to amendments sought by the defendants in a draft 
agreement could not operate so as to create a contract binding on 
both parties in the absence of the execution of the formal document. 
Barwick C. J. and Aiken J expressly stated that their findings were 
based upon the true construction of the document and that they were 
uninfluenced by the fact that in Queensland it was usual lito sell or 
contract to sell land only by a written instrument in a particular form 
i.e. that approved by the Law Society and Real Estate I nstitute ll74 • 
I t is equally true to say in some situations that even though 
the reference to the formal agreement is not expressed as a condition, 
the preparation of the formal document may nevertheless be treated as 
a condition precedent to the formation of a concluded contract. If 
one again considers that parties commonly intend not to be bound 
until a formal contract is executed either because they consider that 
additional terms may need to be negotiated or renegotiated or because 
they wish to protect themselves from the risks of an lIopen contractll, 
it would seem to follow that the more detailed the terms of agreement, 
73(1977) 15 A. L. R. 423 
74 id • per Barwick C.J. 416, per Aiken J, 426 
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the less complexity attached to the transaction and the fewer the 
risks of an open title, the more likely it is that the agreement will be 
held to be enforceable. This is true to some extent but not 
invariably. In each case the question will be one of construction, 
bearing in mind the objective effect of the words used. 
An early example of the situation in which the preparation of 
the formal document was held to be a condition precedent, although 
the reference was not worded as such is the decision in Chinnock v 
Ely75. 
There a real estate agent was authorised to find a buyer for a 
property belonging to the Marchioness of Ely, but on the basis that 
he was not to conclude a contract or commit his principal in writing 
because the property was to be sold subject to conditions as to title 
and it was, therefore, necessary that a formal agreement be prepared 
by the Marchioness1s solicitors. The agent found a prospective 
purchaser but adhered to his instructions. Some time later, the 
Marchioness1s solicitors wrote to the intended purchaser concerning 
the negotiations, stating that they were instructed to proceed with 
the sale and that a draft contract was being prepared and would be 
forwarded shortly. It was held that the letter amounted to no more 
than the solicitors saying that they took the matter up where it had 
stopped and that they would continue the negotiations with a view to 
preparing a contract, the terms of which were acceptable to both 
parties. The stipulation as to the formal contract was a term of the 
assent and there was no agreement independent of that stipulation. 
75 4 De G.J. and S. 638 
30 
A recent illustration of the principle is provided by the 
unreported New Zealand decision in Walker v Bower76 . The plaintiffs 
had negotiated for the sale to them by the defendants of a section 
being part of an area of land not yet subdivided. The plaintiffs 
decided that they wished to purchase the section, the price and the 
deposit were agreed and the plaintiffs then tendered to the 
defendants a document, which was essentially a receipt, which the 
defendant signed. The document contained the names of the parties, 
a description of the property and the price, but also the words "", 
deposit ••• to be held pending formal contract being drawn up by 
vendor's solicitor upon normal terms and such contract being 
acceptable to purchaser's solicitor and subject to the purchasers 
within seven days being unconditionally satisfied as to the building 
rights on the section. II 
Wilson J, in giving judgment for the defendants, found that 
the word "pending" gave the impression that the deposit was to be 
held in suspense until a contract had been drawn up in acceptable 
form. He concluded "the use of the word 'pending
' 
followed by the 
conditions, leaves me satisfied that there was no contract binding on 
the defendants or on the plaintiffs until the vendor's solicitor had 
drawn a document on normal terms, and in a form acceptable to the 
purchaser IS solicitor." 
A similar result was achieved in Edgewater Development Co v 
Bailey77, where the document relied on by the plaintiff was in the 
following terms: 
76 High Court, Auckland, 13.2.75 (A 574/74) Wilson J 
77(1974) 230 E.G. 971 (C.A.) 
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The below-mentioned parties hereby agree that the property 
consisting of six cottages and adjoining land at Carlow Road ... 
shall be sold by Mrs Bailey of 26 Roseberry Street, Kettering, to 
the Edgewater Development Company, Burton Latimer, on the 
following conditions: 
(a) The purchase price to be 4,000 (pounds) payable ten 
percent deposit upon receipt of contracts, balance of 
purchase price on completion (time to be set by vendor's 
solicitors); and 
(b) The Edgewater Development Company are to bear all legal 
costs for both the purchaser and the vendor in this 
transaction. 
The Court of Appeal, Denning M R, Cairns & James LJJ, held 
that the document did not constitute a binding written contract as it 
clearly indicated, that there were various terms which were not 
settled and that the parties were leaving these to be arranged and 
agreed at the time when the actual contract was signed. The 
sentence regarding completion and stating "Time to be set by 
vendor's solicitors" plainly meant that the vendor's solicitors were to 
insert the date at the time contracts were exchanged. There was also 
no agreement as to the time at which possession was to be given and 
whether it should be "vacant" possession. Although there was 
authority for the proposition that in the absence of express terms, 
there was an implied term that vacant possession should be given on 
completion, it was not possible to read such an impl ication into the 
document in the instant case having regard to the surrounding 
circumstances and given that the property comprised six cottages all 
of which were individua IIy let. Finally, it was the Court's view that 
a deposit was normally paid either before or at the time of the 
contract but not after the contract. 
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Walker v Bower78 and the Edgewater Development Co79 case 
may be contrasted with the decision of the High Court of Australia in 
Niesmann v Coilingridge80 which was referred to in Masters v 
81 Cameron as an example of a case in which the reference to the 
formal document was held to be a condition subsequent. There the 
defendant, for a small consideration, gave the plaintiff a written 
document which purported to give to the plaintiff lithe firm offer" of 
a specified property at a specified price, pa rt of which was to be 
payable lion the signing of a contract ll a further part three months 
afterwards and the remainder three years afterwards. The High 
Court (Knox CJ, Rich & Starke JJ) unanimously held that upon the 
plaintiff's acceptance of the offer, a binding contract for the sale of 
the property was constituted. Rich and Start JJ stated: 82 
The provision for payment of the purchase monies on the signing 
of the contract was not, however, in our opinion, a mere 
expression of the desire of the parties as to the manner in which 
the transaction already agreed to would in fact go through 
nor was it a condition of agreement. It was a "term of the 
bargain". Thus, the purchaser could not be compelled to pay the 
purchase money unless the contract was signed. It was a 
condition of the obligation to pay ••. (As) the parties made the 
signing of a contract a term of their bargain, there is no 
difficulty ... in decreeing specific performance of the agreement, 
and so compelling the performance of a stipulation of the 
agreement necessary to its carrying out and due completion. II 
Niesmann v Collingridge83 was applied in Godecke v Kirwan84 . 
78 Supra note 76 
79 Edgewater Development Co v Bai supra note 77 
---'-
80 (1921) 29 C.L.R. 177 
81 Supra note 69 
82 Supra note 80, at p 184-185 
83 Supra note 80 
84(1973} 129 C.L.R. 629 
33 
Both parties had signed a formal document entitled "Offer and 
Acceptance" which comprehensively recorded the terms of sale in no 
less then eleven clauses with added "special conditions ll • A provision 
to the effect that possession should be given and a further instalment 
of the purchase monies paid lIupon signing and execution of a formal 
contract of sale within 28 days of acceptance of this offer ll was held 
by the High Court of Australia not to amount to a condition precedent 
to the existence of a concluded contract but to lIa condition of the 
performance of one or more of the terms of an agreement by which 
the parties are immediately bound ll85 and thus to belong to the second 
of the three classes described in Masters v Cameron86 . 
3. Expression of Mere Desire as to Form 
Where parties have reached a detailed agreement as to terms it 
is more difficult to infer that they should intend the preparation of 
the formal document to operate a a condition precedent to the 
existence of a concluded contract. In this context, the facts as they 
appeared in Chinnock v E1y87 may be contrasted with those later 
considered by the House of Lords in Rossiter v Miller88 . For present 
purposes, these were that the vendors sought to dispose of a large 
area of land which had been divided into lots. They had prepared a 
plan on which the lots were shown together with a number of printed 
conditions of sale. The conditions related to price, title, various 
85 id 641 
86 Supra note 69 
87 Supra note 75 
88(1878) 3 App. Cas. 1124 
34 
building line restrictions, roads and bridges and the use to which the 
land was to be put and they concluded with the stipulation 
Each purchaser will be required to sign a contract embodying the 
foregoing conditions and providing for the payment of a deposit 
at the rate of ten percent on the amount of the purchase money, 
and for the completion of the purchase at the expiration of, not 
exceeding two months from the date of the contract. The costs 
of such contract will be included in the fixed charge for the 
conveyance provided for by the first stipulation. 
The defendant approached the vendors' agent with regard to 
certain lots and was expressly informed that he must purchase subject 
to the conditions stated on the plan. He subsequently offered to 
purchase some of the lots for a price which he named. The agent 
said that he would refer the offer to the vendors and subsequently 
he wrote to the defendant advising him that the vendors had accepted 
the offer, subject to the conditions on the plan, and that their 
sol icitors would shortly forward to him an agreement for purchase. 
The defendant repl ied raising a query as to the time at which he 
should start to build, but otherwise restating his original offer. The 
vendors' agent wrote confirming that the vendors required no 
undertaking as to when building work should commence. The 
vendors' solicitors later sent to the defendant the agreement for sale, 
but the defendant refused to sign the agreement or to complete the 
purchase. 
The House of Lords held that the correspondence constituted a 
written contract and granted the vendors specific performance, Lord 
Blackburn stating89 : 
I quite agree ... that ... it is a necessary part of the plaintiff's 
case to show that the two parties had come to a final and 
complete agreement, for, if not there was no contract. So long 
as they are on Iy in negotiation either party may retract; and 
89 id 1151 
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though the parties may have agreed on all the cardinal points of 
the intended contract, yet, if some particulars essential to the 
ag reement still remain to be settled afterwards, there is no 
contract. The parties, in such a case, are still only in 
negotiation. But the mere fact that the parties have expressly 
stipulated that there shall afterwards be a formal agreement 
prepared, embodying the terms, which shall be signed by the 
parties does not, by itself, show that they continue merely in 
negotiation. It is a matter to be taken into account in construing 
the evidence and determining whether the parties have really 
come to a final agreement or not. But as soon as the fact is 
established of the final mutual assent of the parties so that those 
who draw up the formal agreement have not the power to vary 
the terms already settled, I think the contract is completed. 
The reference to the formal agreement was held to amount to 
no more than an expression of a mere desire to put into a more formal 
or professional shape the contract which the two parties, with unity 
of purpose, had completely formed. The contract which the 
defendant was required to sign 
... will not be a contract at the arbitrium of the vendors, not a 
contract the terms of which they do not know, not a contract the 
provisions of which they will see for the first time when it is 
offered to them to sign, but a contract to which the vendors are 
content, beforehand, to bind and oblige themselves that ~b will 
assume the shape of these stipulations, and no other shape. 
A similar decision was reached in New Zealand in Smith v 
91 Matheson • The parties were both tradesmen and had been 
negotiating the sale to the plaintiff of the defendant's business 
premises together with a vacant section. The plaintiff ultimately 
travelled to visit the defendant, spending the night at the 
defendant's home. During the course of the evening, all the terms of 
the transaction had been fully discussed and agreed. The following 
day the parties attended at the offices of the defendant's accountant 
who was instructed to prepare a memorandum recording the parties' 
90 id 1132 
91 [1945] N.Z.L.R. 291 
36 
agreement. This the accountant did, in the presence of the parties, 
and the defendant later wrote to the plaintiff enclosing a copy of the 
memorandum. The memorandum accurately recorded the names of the 
parties, the price and the subject matter. It also recorded in some 
detai I the stock and book debts to be included in the sale, the name 
under which the plaintiff was to trade, the fact that the vendor was 
to be employed as manager for a specified duration and at a specified 
wage, the fact that ownership of the premises was to be retained by 
the vendor the purchaser leasing the premises on specified terms and 
at a/l times having the option to purchase the premises for a specified 
price, the manner in which the purchase monies for the business and 
town section were to be paid and the interest rate payable on unpaid 
instalments. 
Northcroft J found on the evidence that the parties had 
expressly discussed and agreed that a formal document should be 
drawn up by a solicitor embodying the terms of the contract. He 
held, however, that th is fact did not of itself prevent the agreement 
already reached from being regarded as a concluded contract even if 
express reference to the formal document had been made in the 
memorandum itself. It was evident that the parties had reached 
agreement as to all essential terms and it was not open to the 
defendant to claim that there had been no agreement merely because 
he was subsequently able to call to mind terms which he desired to 
have included but which were not in fact included in the agreement 
made between the parties. 
Similarly, in the Canadian case of Lake Ontario Cement Co v 
Golden Eagle Oil Co Ltd 92 a reference to a formal contract in an 
92(1974) 46 D.L.R. (3d) 639 
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exchange of correspondence was found not to be inconsistent with the 
immediate formation of a binding agreement at the time of the 
exchange. 
The plaintiff manufactured cement and concrete products and 
had entered into negotiations with the defendant for the supply of 
fuel oil to its production plant. The defendant submitted a detailed 
and comprehensive proposal for the supply of oi I for a five year 
period and the plaintiff repl ied expressing its assent to the proposals 
but requesting that consideration be given to the inclusion of certain 
other specified provisions. The letter concluded "Please be advised 
that if this is acceptable to Golden Eagle then we would like to enter 
into an agreement ... on the basis of a formal contract ... as soon as 
possible." The manager of the defendant's refinery sales telephoned 
the plaintiff to advise that the counter-proposals had been accepted 
by the defendant. He confirmed the telephone conversation in a 
subsequent letter to the plaintiff, stating that a draft contract would 
be prepared in accordance with the agreed terms. 
The plaintiff then began to arrange for the installation of 
storage tanks and pipes and it commenced negotiations with a 
shipping company for transportation of the oi I. Representatives of 
the defendant company were inivted to attend, and did attend, a 
meeting with the shipping company so as to provide confirmation of 
the agreement for supply. However, as time elapsed and despite 
repeated assurances from the defendant the draft contrace did not 
materialise. After a delay of some six months, during which time the 
prices for oil had increased dramatically, the defendant informed the 
plaintiff that it could not afford to supply the oi I on the original 
basis. It was suggested that the plaintiff should take oil at the 
current refining cost without profit to the defendant but the plaintiff 
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declined to renegotiate on the basis that the increased price would 
result in it too incurring major losses. 
Parker J, in the Ontario High Court, held that an agreement 
had been reached at the time the plaintiff's counter-proposals were 
accepted by the defendant. Both parties, by their words and 
conduct, had clearly evinced an intention that the agreement should 
be final and binding and there remained nothing which could be the 
subject of further negotiation or clarification. The reference to the 
formal document was not a condition "but an expression that the 
terms agreed upon be put into a formal document,,93. 
A case which can be regarded as an example of a situation in 
which the risks of an "open contract" were somewhat reduced is the 
I rish decision in Law v Robert Roberts & Co. 94 There the 
defendant, a I imited company, offered leasehold premises for sale 
through a firm of land agents. The plaintiff and his solicitor viewed 
the premises with an employee of the firm of land agents who 
provided the plaintiff's solicitor with a copy of the lease for the 
premises. The plaintiff's solicitor subsequently communicated a verbal 
offer to the agents. The agents in turn referred the offer to the 
defendant's managing director who, after consultation with the 
company's other directors, ultimatly advised the agents that the offer 
had been accepted. The agents then wrote to the plaintiff's sol icitor 
confirming that his offer in the named amount had been accepted by 
the defendant and in conclusion stating that the defendant's solicitors 
would be asked to forward a contract immediately. On the same day 
93 id 673 
94[974] I.R. 292 (High Court and Supreme Court judgments 
reported together) 
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the agents wrote a corresponding letter to the defendant's managing 
director confirming that the plaintiff had agreed to purchase and 
requesting that the company's solicitors be instructed to forward a 
contract directly to the plaintiff's solicitor. The defendant's 
managing director wrote to the company's solicitor stating "We have 
today sold the above premises" and instructing them accordingly. 
Kenny J held at first instance that the communications between 
the parties and the agents had resulted in a concluded oral contract. 
The parties and the property were identified and the price and 
completion date agreed. While taking judicial notice of the fact that 
there was a written contract prepared and signed by both parties in 
most of the sales of property in Dublin, he found that the agents 
were authorised to conclude an oral contract binding upon the 
defendants. The agreement made contained no stipulation as to title 
and was, therefore, an "open contract" the result of which being that 
the plaintiff would not be entitled to call for the title to the freehold 
and the title to be shown by the defendant would start with the 
defendant's lease. 
Having cited with approval the decisions in Rossiter v Miller94a 
94b 
and Van Hatzfeldt Wilden burg v Alexander , Kenny J found that 
the letters constituted a sufficient memorandum of the oral contract 
and, as a matter of construction, did not make the execution of a 
further contract a condition of the bargain. The decision was 
unanimously upheld by the Supreme Court (O'Dalaigh CJ, Lavery & 
Haugh JJ) the Court merely expressing its concurrence with the 
decision of Kenny J upon all points. 
At first instance Kenny J made express reference to the fact 
that the plaintiff's solicitor had formerly been employed by the firm of 
sol icitors who acted for the owner of the freehold. He was, 
94a Supra note 88 94b U-912J 1 Ch. 284 
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therefore, personally aware that her title was good and he had 
already had the opportunity to peruse the existing lease to the 
premises. The existence of these factors and the manner in which 
the transaction proceeded tended to point away from an intention on 
his part that his client should be bound only by a formal agreement. 
IV. CARRUTHERS v WHITAKER 
In the cases hitherto discussed, the parties have either 
expressly agreed that the terms of their bargain shall be made the 
subject of a formal agreement or, alternatively, reference to a formal 
agreement has been contained in the writing relied on as constituting 
either the contract or the memorandum. What is the situation, 
however, where parties who have reached a certain stage in their 
negotiations simply refer the matter to their solicitors with the 
intention, or at least the effect, that a formal agreement will be 
afterwards prepared? Does execution of the formal document then 
become a condition precedent to the existence of a contract or is it a 
mere formality, the intention of the parties being merely to record in 
a more formal or precise manner the terms which have al ready been 
agreed? In theory, the same considerations, already discussed, 
should apply. As will become apparent, however, it is essential at 
the outset to distinguish between a IIwritten contract" and an oral 
contract, where the writing is rei ied upon as a memorandum of the 
terms. 
The 
New Zealand 
Whitaker95 . 
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starting point for the discussion in this area in 
is the Court of Appeal decision in Carruthers v 
The facts, briefly stated, were that the plaintiff entered 
into oral negotiations with the defendant for the purchase of the 
defendant's farm. The latter indicated that he would be prepared to 
sell the farm as a going concern for a specified price. There was 
some discussion, in general terms, as to what should be included in 
the price and the following day the plaintiff contacted the defendant 
and indicated that he wished to purchase the property. The parties 
later instructed their respective solicitors. The defendant's solicitor 
drafted an agreement for sale and purchase and, after obtaining his 
client's approval as to its terms, forwarded it to the plaintiff's 
solicitor for perusal and signature. The plaintiff duly attended at 
the offices of his own sol icitor whereupon he signed the agreement, 
completed a landless declaration and handed over the deposit monies. 
The agreement and the deposit were later forwarded to the 
defendant's solicitor who in turn sent the plaintiff's solicitor a 
receipt. The defendant subsequently refused to proceed with the 
sale on the grounds that his doctor had advised him that to leave the 
farm would be detrimental to his health. 
The plaintiff sought an order for specific performance on the 
basis that the parties had concluded an oral agreement of which the 
draft contract and the receipt were a sufficient memorandum or, in 
the alternative. that the letter forwarded by the vendor's solicitor, 
enclosing the draft agreement, amounted to an offer to sell on the 
terms contained in the draft agreement which offer was accepted by 
95 [1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 667 
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the plaintiff when the agreement was signed and it was returned to 
the vendor's sol icitor. I t was argued for the defendant that the 
intention of the parties was that neither should be bound until a 
formal document had been executed by them both, that event, 
therefore amounting to a condition precedent to the existence of a 
concluded contract. In support of this contention, the defendant 
placed reliance on the "subject to contract" cases and their analysis 
in Masters v Cameron 96 . 
At first instance97 , Wilson J found that the negotiations which 
took place on the farm had not resulted in a concluded oral contract 
because they were carried out subject to the preparation of a formal 
document. But the parties' intention didn't extend as far as actual 
execution of the document but only as to approval of its terms and, 
once this condition had been satisfied, there was a binding contract 
between them. Wilson J accepted the plaintiff's contention that this 
had occurred when the draft agreement, the terms of which were 
approved by the defendant, was forwarded to the plaintiff's solicitor 
under cover of the defendant's solicitor's letter and the offer therein 
contained had been accepted by the plaintiff's signature and the 
ag reement's return. 
Pausing here it is submitted, with respect, that if what was 
relied upon was in fact a written contract (there being no oral 
contract) then it is somewhat artificial to assert that the parties 
intended not that the agreement be "signed" but only that it be 
"approved!!. At this point one might consider whether it was possible 
96(1954) 91 C.L.R. 353 
97Whitaker v Carruthers [1975J 1 N.Z.L.R. 372 
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to say instead that the preparation and execution of the formal 
document was not a condition at all, but merely the means to be 
adopted to record the agreement al ready concluded. I n other words, 
that the situation fell within the first category of the Masters v 
C 98 I' ameron ana YSls. However, Wilson J went on to give a further 
reason as to why the case was not within the "subject to contract" 
rules, in the techn ical sense, th is being that lithe contract signed by 
the plaintiffs was not a more formal record of the terms discussed but 
a new and significantly different contractll99 in so far as it was 
expressed to be "subject to finance" and contained alternative 
provisions to those discussed regarding the quantity of hay which the 
defendant was to leave on the farm. Remaining with the offer and 
acceptance analysis, Wilson J concluded that the signature of the 
defendantls solicitor was sufficient to bind the defendant, he having 
approved the draft agreement and thereby having authorised his 
sol icitor to convey the lIoffer" to the plaintiff. Accordingly, Wilson J 
gave judgment for the plaintiff and ordered that the agreement be 
specifically performed. 
The defendant appealed against the judgels findings both that 
there was a concluded contract and that there was a sufficient 
memorandum to satisfy the statute 100. The appeal was allowed, the 
Court of Appeal (McCarthy P, Richmond and Woodhouse JJ) having 
held that the parties intended to enter into a binding contract only 
by way of the formal agreement executed on both sides and that the 
vendor IS solicitor's letter and enclosed draft amounted only to an 
98 Supra note 96 
99Supra note 97 at p 378 
100 [1975} 2 N.Z.L.R. 667 
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invitation to treat. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was 
delivered by Richmond J who stated 101 
It is established by the evidence ... that at the time when the 
parties instructed their respective solicitors they all had in mind 
only one form of contract which would govern the sale and 
purchase of the farm, namely, a formal agreement in writing to be 
prepared and approved by the solicitors. When parties in 
negotiation for the sale and purchase of property act in this way, 
then the ordinary inference from their conduct is that they have 
in mind and intend to contract by a document which each will be 
required to sign. It is unreasonable to suppose that either party 
would contemplate that anything short of the signing of the 
document by both parties would bring finality to their 
negotiations. Furthermore, both parties would expect their 
solicitors to handle the transaction in a way which would give 
them proper protection from the legal point of view. There is no 
evidence in the present case to rebut this prima facie inference. 
Richmond J relied strongly upon the judgment of 
Lord Greene M R 102 in Eccles v Bryant having found that although 
the arrangement there was expressed to be "subject to contract" 
there was nevertheless a marked similarity between the two cases. 
He cited with approval the passage from Lord Greene's judgment 
where, after reaffirming that the manner in which a binding contract 
is to be created is dependent on the intention of the parties, 
L d G t ' d103 or reene con Inue 
In such a contract as this, there is a well-known, common and 
customary method of dealing; namely, by exchange, and anyone 
who contemplates that method of deal ing cannot contemplate the 
coming into existence of a binding contract before the exchange 
ta kes pI ace. 
Richmond J considered that in New Zealand the common 
practice was to obtain the signature of both vendor and purchaser to 
both copies of the agreement. He went on to refer to the decision in 
101 id 671 
102[1948] Ch. 93 
1 03 id . 99 
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Storer v Manchester City Council 1 04, where the English Court of 
Appeal had found that the contract came into existence prior to 
exchange, but concluded that the case turned on special facts of 
which Lawton L J had said 105 
(they were) enough to rebut the inferences which are normally to 
be drawn as to the intention of the parties when there are 
negotiations for a contract of sale carried out between solicitors -
the inferences that should be drawn in the kind of situation with 
which Eccles v Bryant was concerned. 
Finally, Richmond J held that whereas in Eccles v Bryant106 
the intention to be bound only by formal contract emerged from the 
words lIsubject to contract" and from the circumstances that the 
transaction was in the hands of solicitors, in the instant case it 
emerged from the parties' conversation and the solicitors' letters all of 
which led to the further inference that the manner of becoming bound 
should be the ordinary and customary method. 
It should be remembered, however, that when 
Lord Greene M R in Eccles v Bryant 107 spoke of "a contract such as 
this" he was referring to negotiations which were expressly "subject 
to contractU where "for over a hundred years the courts have held 
that the effect of the words is that the matter remains in 
108 
negotiation II until a formal contract is concluded . Eccles v 
109 . Bryant merely took the initial proposition a stage further by 
104(1974] 3 All E.R. 824 
1 05 id . 829 
106 Supra note 102 
107 Supra note 102 
108Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd (1975] Ch. 146 per 
Lord Denning 159-160 
109 Supra note 102 
46 
declaring that in England a formal contract is not "concluded 11 until, 
in addition to the documents having been executed, they are also 
"exchanged" . 
In Storer v Manchester City Council 110 the English Court of 
Appeal found that the contract, for the sale to the plaintiff of the 
council house in which he lived, was concluded when the Council 
made an "offer" in the form of the draft agreement forwarded with its 
accompanying letter, which was "accepted" when the plaintiff signed 
and returned the agreement. The parties
' 
correspondence was not 
expressed to be "subject to contract" and the Town Clerk's letter, 
under cover of which the agreement was forwarded, was unequivocal 
in its terms. It referred to the "agreement for sale" as opposed to a 
draft agreement and stated "If you will sign the agreement and return 
it to me I will send you the agreement signed on behalf of the 
Corporation in exchange. II Moreover, the transaction proceeded 
against the background of the Council's stated policy which was to 
dispense with the full legal formalities in allowing tenants to purchase 
their houses. There was to be no investigation as to title and the 
document devised by the Council was intended as "a simple form of 
agreement which could be entered into to enable the sale to take 
effect at the earliest possible date". 
Arguably, when Lawton L J spoke of the "inferences which are 
normally drawn when there are negotiations •.. carried out 
between solicitors - the inferences which should be drawn in the kind 
111 
of situation with which Eccles v Bryant was concerned" he was 
merely emphasising that in the normal course of events, a transaction 
110 Supra note 104 
111 Storer v Manchester City Council supra note 104 at p 829 
47 
proceeding with the full legal formalities and conducted by English 
sol icitors would be expressly "subject to contract" and not, therefore, 
binding until exchange. Lawton L J found that the Council's 
intention was that when the tenant fully signed, the house was his 
and the language of the Town Clerk's letter was consistent with that 
intention. This view is seen to be supported by the judgment of 
Lord Denning M R' in which he stated "where there is no agreement 
'subject to contract l the only question is whether a contract has been 
concluded"112 . 
But in Carruthers v Whitaker113 , Wilson JI S finding that the 
document included terms which differed from those orally discussed 
precluded the Court of Appeal from holding that the parties intended 
to be bound by anything other than the formal document. Leaving 
aside for the meantime the application of the authenticated signature 
fiction, it was almost impossible to conceive that a written contract 
could be concluded by anything less than the signature of both 
parties to the document. 
It is, therefore, possible to reconcile Carruthers v Whitaker 114 
with earlier New Zealand decisions, for example, the decision in 
115 Saunderson v Purchase , when at first glance the position might 
appear otherwise. In Saunderson v Purchase, Finlay J found that 
the parties had reached an oral agreement as to all essential terms. 
112 id . 827 
113Supra note 100 
114
'bid 
115[1958] N.Z.L.R. 588. 
N.Z.L.R. 291 
Also Smith v Matheson [1945] 
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The solicitor acting for the defendant-vendor subsequently prepared a 
formal agreement which was given to the plaintiff-purchaser. The 
plaintiff signed the agreement, paying a deposit to the land agent 
who had been authorised by the defendant to conclude the sale of the 
property. The agent signed and gave to the plaintiff a receipt. 
Later the defendant purported to sell the property to a third party at 
an increased price. 
Finlay J found that the defendant's solicitor had been 
authorised to prepare the formal agreement and that in doing so he 
had correctly stated the terms of the parties' oral contract. The 
signature to the receipt was affixed by the agent, once again with 
the defendant's authority and, on the basis of the decision in Timmins 
116a 
v Morland Street Property Co Ltd ,the two documents could be 
read together thereby constituting a sufficient memorandum of the 
concluded oral contract. 
Almost contemporaneously with the decision in Carruthers v 
Wh 't k 116b I a er , a similar result was achieved by the High Court of 
Australia in Allen v Carbone 117. The plaintiff-purchaser sought to 
rely on an oral agreement as evidenced by an authority given by the 
defendant to a real estate agent, who was also the plaintiff's brother, 
in the fol lowing terms: 
I authorise and direct you to sell my property [then described] 
to [the plaintiff] for [a specified price] ... You are authorised 
to accept a deposit of 10 percent of the purchase price and I will 
enter into a Contract for Sale in the form approved by the Real 
Estate I nstitute of New South Wales. 
Particular consideration was given to the practice of drawing 
116a[1958] Ch. 110 
116bSupra note 100 
117(1975) 132 C.L.R. 528 
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"inferences ll , it having been argued for the plaintiff on appeal that 
the trial judge should have confined himself to construing the 
language used by the parties in the course of the conversation in 
which it was said a concluded agreement had been reached. The 
High Court (Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ) stated: 118 
No doubt it is right to say that the intention of the parties to a 
contract wholly in writing is to be gathered from the four corners 
of the instrument. The same may be said when parties have 
brought into existence a document intended to comprehensively 
record the terms of an ag reement thus far reached, 
notwithstanding that it makes provision for the subsequent 
execution of a more formal contract which may contain terms not 
yet agreed. But even in these cases it is legitimate in the course 
of construing the document to have regard, when appropriate, to 
subject matter and surrounding circumstances. Here, however, 
we are concerned not with the construction of a written contract 
or document in the senses at ready discussed, but with an informal 
agreement arising out of an oral conversation .... In resolving 
this dispute it is legitimate to ascertain the terms of the 
agreement then made by the parties, that is to say what the 
parties relevantly intended, by drawing inferences from their 
words and their conduct in the making of that agreement. Where 
parties reach an agreement which is expressed informally ... the 
terms of their bargain are not ordinarily recorded in meticulous 
detaif ... To ascertain their intention it is often necessary to 
resort to inference, a process for which there is little or no 
scope when the parties have taken care to comprehensively record 
the terms of their agreement in written form. 
The Court concluded that the trial judge had had ample 
material from which to infer as he did, that the parties mutually 
contemplated that the contract should come into existence only on the 
signing and exchange of the formal document. The first consideration 
in this respect was that the usual method of selling real estate in 
New South Wales was by means of the signing and exchange of 
contracts. Secondly, it appeared that no departure from the usual 
method was intended because there had been no discussion of the 
terms (other than price) which one would expect to find in a binding 
118 id . 531-532 
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contract for the sale of real estate. Thirdly, and most importantly, 
the agent's written authority made it plain that the parties were to 
enter into a formal contract containing additional terms and the agent 
had acted in conformity with the parties' intention in instructing the 
defendant's solicitor to prepare a draft contract to be forwarded to 
the plaintiff. 
V. THE SUBSEQUENT CASES 
The Court of Appeal subsequently applied its decision in 
Carruthers v Whitaker 119 in Concorde Enterprises Ltd v 
120 Anthony Motors (Hutt) Ltd . The alleged agreement in that case 
did not relate to the sale and purchase of land but rather to the 
manufacture of supplies of an emulsion producing gun by the 
plaintiff, Concorde Enterprises, and their purchase and distribution 
in Australia by the defendant, Anthony Motors. 
The plaintiff alleged that a written agreement had been 
concluded in the course of the exchange of correspondence between 
the parties' solicitors. The evidence showed that the defendant's 
sol icitor had requested the plaintiff's sol icitor to prepare a draft 
agreement containing proposed terms which were initially outlined to 
him under some thirteen separate heads. The parties themselves later 
met at the defendant's business premises and further negotiations 
took place. The plaintiff's solicitor prepared and forwarded a draft 
agreement which included several alterations to the proposed terms 
and in the course of a subsequent telephone conversation, the 
defendant's solicitor suggested yet additional amendments which were 
119 [1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 667 
120 [1981] 2 N.Z.L.R. 385 
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agreed to by the plaintiff's solicitor. The defendant's solicitor was to 
confirm that his client consented to the additional amendments and he 
later did so by letter addressed to the plaintiff's solicitor. The 
plaintifffs solicitor replied, recording his cI ient's agreement also and 
advising that he would have the agreement retyped and forwarded to 
the defendant's solicitor for execution. The plaintiff contended that a 
contract had been concluded by the defendant's solicitorfs letter or 
alternatively that the letter amounted to an offer which had been 
accepted by the plaintifffs solicitor's letter. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal (consisting of Cooke, 
Richardson & Somers JJ) was del ivered by Cooke J who reaffirmed 
that the test to be applied to determine the existence of a contract 
was an objective one regardless of whether the classical analysis of 
offer and acceptance was adopted or the wider approach referred to 
in Boulder Consolidated Ltd v Tangaere 121. The Court found that 
the negotiations had been conducted partly between the solicitors, 
with reference back to their respective cI ients, and partly between 
the parties directly but that the purpose of the negotiations was to 
have prepared by the manufacturer's solicitors and executed by both 
parties an important commercial agreement of some complexity. 
Cooke J referred to the decision in Carruthers v Whitaker 122 citing 
with approval passages in the judgment delivered by Richmond J. He 
held that although in the field of commercial contracts there was no 
need for signed writing as evidence yet the inference, that parties 
who have in mind a formal agreement in writing to be prepared and 
approved by solicitors intend to contract by a document which each 
121 [1980] 1 N.Z.L.R. 560 
122 Supra note 119 
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will be required to sign, was the same in the absence of factors to 
the contrary. In the instant case there was nothing to displace the 
natural inference at the time the negotiations began and while it was 
possible that the parties might subsequently have become !lad idem" 
and might have then intended to be bound in the absence of 
signature, such a new turn in their intentions could not be 
unilateral. Applying the objective approach, Cooke J held that it was 
impossible to extract or construct from the correspondence, or from 
the negotiations as a whole, any agreement that the contract was to 
be treated as made in the absence of execution. 
Given the facts as they existed in the Concorde Enterprises 123 
case, it is difficult to envisage that a contrary result could have been 
ach ieved. Th is was not a situation where the parties had reached a 
concluded agreement, later deciding to reduce it to written form but 
rather a case where the preparation, approval and execution of a 
formal agreement had been contemplated from the outset. The 
negotiations had taken place throughout with express reference to the 
formal agreement which was in turn redrafted in the light of each 
subsequent amendment. The parties intended to contract by means of 
the formal document and, as in Carruthers v Whitaker 124 it was 
virtually impossible to infer in these circumstances that they should 
intend to be bound upon mere approval of the terms included in the 
document rather than upon execution of the document itself. 
A similar situation arose in the unreported case of Strack v 
123Concorde Enterprises Ltd v Anthony Motors (Hutt) Ltd 
Supra note 120 
124 Supra note 119 
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Alpers Motel Limited 125. The plaintiff who resided in Christchurch 
had been interested for some time in purchasing the motel business of 
the defendant company in Auckland. The parties had at one stage 
entered into a conditional agreement for the sale and purchase of the 
business, but this had ultimately lapsed. Some time later, the 
plaintiff was approached by a real estate agent who agreed to act as 
the plaintiff's agent with a view to securing his purchase of the 
motels. The agent was subsequently authorised by the defendants to 
sell the motels. After making certain enquiries as to the defendant 
company's books, the plaintiff decided to submit a further offer and 
an agreement for sale and purchase was prepared by the agent and 
forwarded to the plaintiff for perusal and signature. The plaintiff's 
solicitors made certain amendments to the agreement and it was then 
signed by the plaintiff and returned to the agent for submission to 
the defendant. However, the two directors of the defendant 
company,a Mrs Morton and a Mr Page, were not happy with the 
agreement and requested two further amendments. The agent 
telephoned the plaintiff regarding the amendments and the plaintiff 
later sent the agent a telegram advising that the amendments were 
acceptable. The agreement and the telegram were delivered to the 
directors who took the documents to their solicitors. Mr Page 
ultimately signed the agreement and advised the agent that he had 
done so but Mrs Morton refused to proceed further with the 
transaction. 
It was argued for the plaintiff that by signing the agreement 
in itially and returning it to the agent the plaintiff had made an offer 
and that thereafter the two amendments requested by the defendant 
125High Court, Auckland, 29.11.82 (A 97/81), Wallace J. 
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amounted to a counter-offer which was accepted by the plaintiff's 
telegram. It was submitted that the contract had thereby been 
concluded and that the agreement subsequently signed by Mr Page 
satisfied the requirements of the Contracts Enforcement Act, 1956. 
Alternatively, it was contended that a contract was concluded when 
Mr Page signed the agreement and advised the agent of his 
acceptance, his signature being sufficient to bind the company in 
terms of the company's articles and section 42(1)(b) of the 
Companies Act, 1955. 
Wallace J rejected the plaintiff's first argument and held that it 
was impossible to construe the alterations sought by the defendant as 
a counter-offer which had been accepted by the plaintiff. This had 
not been the view of the defendant company's directors and it was, 
moreover, insupportable against the whole background to the 
transaction. The situation clearly fell within the bounds of the 
decisions in Carruthers v Whitaker 126 and Concorde Enterprises Ltd v 
Anthony Motors (Hutt) Ltd 127 in so far as it was one of those 
occasions where the vendor, to the knowledge of the plaintiff's agent, 
was to be bound only on the execution of a formal contract. Wallace 
J found that the plaintiff was also unable to succeed on the basis of 
the alternative argument put forward. Mr Page's telephone 
communication to the agent, when viewed objectively, could not be 
treated as a communication of the defendant company's acceptance 
because Mr Page had said no more than that he himself had signed 
the agreement and had left Mrs Morton with their solicitor. Mr Page 
126 Supra note 119 
127 Supra note 120 
55 
had at all times made it clear that Mrs Morton's agreement to the sale 
was crucial and this had been well understood by the plaintiff's 
agent. 
Despite the Court of Appeal's decision in Carruthers v 
Whitaker 128 and its subsequent endorsement in Concorde Enterprises 
Ltd v Anthony Motors (Hutt) Ltd 129, there remain a number of 
instances where the High Court in New Zealand has found in favour 
of an oral contract although the parties have placed their transaction 
in the hands of solicitors and have contemplated the preparation of a 
formal agreement. 
Of the post Carruthers v Whitaker130 decisions, the first in 
which the "ordinary inferences!! were found to be displaced was the 
f N t K· W'lk' 131 case 0 ew on mg v I mson . There the vendor wished to 
dispose of a one fifth acre section which was part of a larger area of 
land, at the time unsubdivided. He instructed a real estate agent in 
relation to the sale who later introduced the plaintiff as a prospective 
purchaser. The parties, who as it happened were both consulting 
engineers, met on the site and viewed it together. The defendant 
pointed out the boundaries, advised the plaintiff that there was to be 
a building I ine restriction and indicated where it was to run. There 
was no discussion as to price but the plaintiff took this matter up 
with the defendant's agent who advised him of the amount of the 
deposit required and of the purchase price sought by the defendant. 
The plaintiff later telephoned the agent and told him that he would 
128 Supra note 119 
129 Supra note 120 
130 Supra note 119 
131 [1976] 2 N.Z.L.R. 321 
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like to buy the property and was prepared to pay the quoted price. 
The agent relayed the plaintiff's offer to the defendant who 
telephoned the agent the following day and informed him that the 
offer would be accepted. The plaintiff then paid the deposit to the 
agent and received the agents receipt. The defendant's solicitors 
subsequently wrote to the plaintiff's solicitors regarding the sale. 
The letter recorded all the material terms of the transaction stating in 
conclusion that the defendant's solicitors were awaiting the 
subdivisional plan and that when it was obtained they would forward 
an agreement for signature. In the meantime the sale sign had been 
removed from the property, the plaintiff showed the section to several 
of his friends and visited the surveyors and the defendant, whose 
offices were in the same building, on one or two occasions to enquire 
as to the progress of the subdivision. 
At the time the plan was deposited, the defendant's solicitor 
wrote to the plaintiff's solicitor requesting the transfer document. 
The plaintiff's solicitors replied that they had not received a copy of 
lithe agreement" and asked for a further copy. The defendant's 
solicitors then realised that there was no agreement in writing and 
sought the plaintiff's solicitor's comments. In the interim the 
defendant received a higher offer for the section and subsequently 
refused to complete. 
Beattie J accepted the plaintiff's evidence that he considered 
that after the payment of his deposit it was only a matter of formality 
that some process of law would have to be carried through. He was 
relying on his own solicitor to prepare what was necessary after the 
plans had been prepared and the survey completed and there was no 
doubt in h is mind that the defendant would not carry out that to 
which he had agreed. In cross-examination the plaintiff had conceded 
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that he expected to sign some document setting out the terms 
discussed but none hand come to hand. According to the plaintiff 
"there was usually some sort of formality or signing to be done in 
nearly every deal of this nature" but 'he considered himself bound to 
purchase as soon as he had paid the deposit. 
Beattie J found on the evidence that the parties' discussions 
with each other and with the defendant's agent had resulted in a 
clearly defined oral contract as to the identity of the parties, the 
identity of the property, the price and the date of settlement and the 
question of the area and dimensions of the section and the height 
restriction that was to apply. Moreover, he was absolutely satisfied 
that the parties had always thought that there was an agreement 
between them. There being a concluded oral contract, the case was 
distinguishable from Carruthers v Wh itaker 132 wh ich, for the same 
reasons, was not at variance with the decision in Smith v 
Matheson 133. 
Beattie J then turned to consider whether the oral agreement 
was evidenced by a sufficient memorandum in writing. He found that 
the decision in Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd 134 had established 
that to satisfy the statute the writing reI ied upon had to contain an 
express or implied recognition that the contract had been entered into 
in addition to its terms. While the contents of the receipt alone were 
not sufficient to decide the issue, the letter from the defendant's 
solicitor was. It contained the words "a purchase" and "purchaser ll t 
instead of referring to a proposed sale, and stated "there is to be a 
132 Supra note 119 
133 [1945J N.Z.L.R. 291 
134 [1975 J Ch. 146 
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building line restriction". It was not a "subject to contract" letter as 
h d b h I . h T' E 135 d h .. . a een t e etter In t e lverton states case an t e wrIting In 
the New Zealand decision in Walker v Bower 136. 
It was argued for the defendant that the existence or 
otherwise of a prior oral contract was immaterial to the ratio in 
Carruthers v Whitaker 137 the test being merely whether it was part 
of the negotiations, expressly or impliedly, that the transaction 
should be perfected in writing. Beattie J rejected this argument and 
in so doing stated: 138 
As I read Carruthers v Whitaker, Wilson J ••• found against an 
oral contract. The case proceeded on the basis of a contract in 
writing. Accordingly, the decision in my view is not an authority 
on a sufficient memorandum of an existing contract 
Richmond J ••. expl icitly makes it clear that the parties had in 
mind a written contract whereas here, the defendant's 
solicitors asked for a transfer when the only writing was a 
receipt and two letters. This is indicative ..• that the parties 
never intended their transaction should be suspended until an 
agreement was signed ... At the time the writing started there 
was already an oral contract in existence, which situation, in my 
opinion, excludes the customary and common method of dealing as 
the only one contemplated by the parties. 
Whether the outcome in Newton King v Wilkinson 139 would have 
been the same had the vendor's solicitor in fact forwarded a draft 
ag reement is a matter for speculation. The ordinary "conveyancer in 
the street" might well be tempted to conclude that the vendor's 
solicitors, given that there was a delay of some months before the 
plan was deposited, had merely forgotten to forward the agreement or 
else had assumed that the agreement had been prepared by the 
135Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd Ibid 
136High Court, Auckland, 13.2.75 (A 574/74) Wilson J. 
137 Supra note 119 
138Supra note 131 at p. 326 
139 Supra note 131 
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vendor's real estate agent. As regards the parties own expectations, 
it might also be fairly assumed that of all people consulting engineers 
would have a fairer idea than most of "the sort of formality or 
signing to be done in nearly every deal of this nature". But be that 
as it may, the parties had clearly reached an agreement as to terms 
in some detail. They were not dealing with one another at arm's 
length, as was the case for example in Strack v Alpers Motel Ltd 140, 
and were presumably aware of the practical aspects involved in the 
subdivision of land, and to be considered when purchasing hill 
sections suitable for building, even if they were not fully aware of 
the legal aspects involved. 
Once a concluded oral contract is found to exist which is 
found not to be conditional upon the preparation and execution of a 
formal document, then it should be irrelevant whether the proceedings 
are instituted before or after the formal document comes into 
existence. However, where parties have instructed sol icitors and 
proceedings are brought prior to the preparation of the formal 
agreement it is open to question whether the parties in fact intended 
the preparation of a formal agreement at all. So long as a sufficient 
memorandum of the oral contract exists, parties will not necessarily 
intend the preparation of a formal document. In fact it is possible to 
envisage a situation in which a party's regal adviser, perceiving that 
his client has secured a good bargain or that the other party may be 
tempted to resile, chooses to rely solely on the oral contract as 
evidenced in writing, or the informal written agreement, in an attempt 
to specifically exclude the argument that the "ordinary inferences" 
140 Supra note 125 
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should apply. Such a situation may appear to have occurred in the 
unreported case of Riley v Jones 141 • 
I n the Riley 142 case the plaintiffs were trustees of a family 
trust established for the benefit of the wife and children of a Mr C 
Fifield, the brother of the second trustee. Mr Fifield lived next door 
to the defendant who had separated from his wife some years earlier. 
The departure of his wife and children from the home had caused the 
defendant a great deal of emotional stress. He had taken to drinking 
heavily and had become depressed and even suicidal. Eventually he 
had tried to burn his house down with the result that although the 
house was not completely destroyed it was rendered uninhabitable. 
For some time the defendant then I ived in a sleep-out behind the 
garage before moving to a motor camp. He had no resources with 
which to reinstate the house and no incentive to keep the grounds in 
order. Mr Fifield and his wife decided that if they could they would 
purchase the property partly because they wished to extend their 
own property and partly because they wished to remove the "eyesore" 
which the derelict house had become. Mr Fifield, deciding that it 
would not be wise at the outset to reveal his identity to the 
defendant, made two offers for the property via agents both of which 
were rejected. Mr Fifield then approached the defendant personally 
asking him whether he wished to sell the property and, if so, for 
how much. The defendant replied that he was prepared to sell and 
named a price which Mr Fifield said he would pay. The defendant 
then accompanied Mr Fifield to the latter's home "S0 that an agreement 
141 High 
Hardie Boys J. 
Court, 
142 Riley v Jones Ibid 
Christchurch, 17. 11 .83 (A 224/81) 
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could be made Upll. Mr Fifield's wife wrote out two notes which were 
dictated by her husband with the defendant present. The first was 
headed with the name and address of the defendant and the date and 
read "/ will sell the property (then described) for (the specified 
price) cash to the Fifield fami Iy. Possession date 11.9.81. II The 
name of the defendant's solicitor was recorded at the foot of the note 
and it was then signed by the defendant. The second note was 
similarly headed with the name and address of Mr Fifield and the date 
and read "We will buy the property (then described) for (the 
specified price) cash. Mr Fifield's sol icitor was named at the foot of 
the note which was signed by Mr Fifield lias agent". Mr Fifield 
explained that he had signed as agent because he envisaged that the 
property might be registered in the name of the family trust. 
Mr Fifield kept the note which the defendant had signed and 
sent it to his solicitor and the defendant did likewise. Mr Fifield's 
solicitor then wrote to the defendant's solicitor with reference to lithe 
contractll and enclosing a memorandum of transfer for execution by 
the defendant. The defendant refused to proceed with the sale. 
Although the defendant had at no time discussed his intentions with 
the Fifields, he had planned to use the proceeds of sale to buy a 
caravan in which to five and had arrived at the asking price by 
adding to the cost of the caravan what he thought to be the total 
value of the encumbrances against the property. However, in so 
doing, the defendant had miscalculated and had failed to take account 
of a registered mortgage in favour of his wife on account of her 
share in the equity of the home. Prior to the hearing, it also 
transpired that the defendant's family had responded to his plight 
and there was a possibility that they might provide funds with which 
to reinstate the building. 
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The first argument advanced for the defendant was that at the 
time the notes were signed, the defendant lacked the requisite 
contractual capacity. Hardie Boys J found, however, that the 
defendant had been well able to think and make decisions in a rational 
way at the time the discussions took place. The Fifields had not 
known that the defendant was in any way mentally unbalanced nor 
ought they to have known. Moreover, it was impossible to regard the 
purchase price as lI un fair" to the defendant because it was 
considerably in excess of the market value as assessed by two 
independent valuers. The defendant's alternative ground of defence 
was that the contract notes were signed in the absence of any 
intention to enter into a legal relationship. Nowhere did they contain 
words such as "contract", "agreement", "offer" or "accept ll • The 
defendant's evidence was that he did not believe that he was entering 
into a document of legal efficacy at all and the notes should be 
construed as no more than mutual invitations to treat. 
Hardie Boys J found that: 
As in any other instance where it is necessary to ascertain the 
intention of a party to a contract or in a contractual situation, 
the Court must look at the language which is being used and not 
at what the party may subsequently say his intention really was. 
The language used must of course be considered against the 
relevant factual background, but what the Court is required to 
ascertain is the effect which, looking at the language which the 
defendant chose to use, it might reasonably be expected to have 
upon the mind of the person to whom it was addressed. 
While it was an important factor in determining the parties' 
intention that an offeror had reserved a material term for further 
negotiation and agreement, this was not the situation in the instant 
case where agreement had been reached not only as to parties, price 
and subject-matter, but also as to possession date and as to payment 
in cash. 
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Applying the principles as they were expressed in 
Boulder Consolidated· Ltd v Tangaere 143 and Gibson v Manchester 
City Council 144 to the facts of the case, Hardie Boys J had no doubt 
that whatever the defendant's true intention may have been, the 
contract notes were so expressed as to create a binding contract. 
This was so regardless of whether they were to be regarded as an 
offer by the defendant and an acceptance by Mr Fifield or vice versa. 
They clearly showed a meeting of minds as to the sale and purchase 
and as to the essential terms thereof. They went far beyond an 
invitation to treat and showed a concluded contract. 
Hardie Boys J went on to hold that he was unable to read into 
the mere inclusion in the notes of the solicitors names any 
contractual intention that the contract should be subject to solicitor's 
approval. Even if he had found otherwise, the Court of Appeal in 
Provost Developments Ltd v Collingwood Towers Ltd 145 had 
established that where there was a condition subsequent to this effect 
the discretion conferred upon the solicitor extended to the 
"conveyancing aspects" only and not to a consideration of the 
adequacy of the price. Finally, in regard to the defendant's final 
submission, Hardie Boys J held that Mr Fifield had sufficiently 
designated the principal on whose behalf he was entering into the 
contract. 
An example of a situation in which the Court found in favour 
of a concluded oral contract although the formal document had been 
143 [1980 J N.Z.L.R.560 
144[1979J 1 All E.R. 972 
145[1980J 2 N.Z.L.R. 205 
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prepared is provided by the recent unreported decision in Anae v 
Lambert146 . The plaintiff in that case had responded to the 
defendant's advertisement for the sale of a block of three shops. 
The plaintiff's husband was familiar with the property which was close 
to his own business premises and the property and the price met with 
his and h is wife's requirements. The plaintiff's husband, feeling that 
in the past he had missed out on certain properties because he had 
been "too slow", telephoned his wife and told her to buy the property 
and she in turn then arranged to view the property with one of the 
two defendant vendors, a Mr Lambert. The plaintiff and her husband 
had had some experience in buying properties and, after inspecting 
the foundations, the plaintiff offered to purchase the shops for the 
advertised price which Mr Lambert accepted on behalf of himself and 
his co-owner, a Mrs Power. Settlement date was agreed and the 
plaintiff gave Mr Lambert a cheque for a substantial deposit for which 
he gave her a receipt. The plaintiff then announced II I have got itll 
and indicated that she was pleased that she had been able to secure 
the property. Both parties agreed that forms of agreement would be 
written out so that their solicitors could "process" the sale. 
Mr Lambert was also experienced in the buying and selling of 
property and Mrs Power, with whom he lived, worked as a real estate 
agent. Mr Lambert had already come equipped with a standard form 
agreement but because he had only brought one copy and it was 
desirable that the parties should have one each, they agreed that the 
plaintiff should call at Mr Lambert's home that evening to collect a 
second copy. The plaintiff duly called at the appointed hour and was 
146 High Court, Auckland 11.7.85 (A 1348{84) Hillyer J. 
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given an agreement for sale and purchase on which the parties' 
names, the address of the property, the purchase price and the 
amount of the deposit had been filled in. There was little discussion 
at the time because the defendants had dinner guests and the 
plaintiff left with the agreement saying that she and her husband 
would sign it and return it the following day. However, when the 
plaintiff contacted Mr lambert the next day she was told that he and 
Mrs Power had decided to withdraw the property from the market. 
The defendants had in fact received a higher offer from a third 
party. 
Hillyer J found that Mr lambert was authorised to conclude a 
sale on behalf of both vendors and that the parties' discussion had 
resulted in an oral agreement as to all essential terms. On the 
evidence, he concluded "This is not, in my view, a case such as 
Carruthers v Whitaker ... where the parties did not intend to be 
bound until a document was signed by both vendor and purchaser. II 
Having found in favour of a binding oral agreement it remained to be 
considered whether there was a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the 
statute. However, Hillyer J found that even if the receipt and the 
agreement could be read together which he doubted, there being 
insufficient reference in the one to the other, there was a flaw in the 
alleged memorandum in so far as the documents failed to record the 
settlement date for the transaction. Although in the absence of 
agreement the Court could imply that settlement should take place at 
a reasonable date, this course was precluded where a specific date 
had in fact been expressly agreed. The date then became a material 
term of the contract, the absence of which in the memorandum was 
fatal. I n the end result, however, Hillyer J was able to find 
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sufficient acts of part performance to render the contract capable of 
en forcement. 
There is one further category of case in which the lIordinary 
inferences" referred to in Carruthers v Whitaker147 are seen to be 
rebutted. There is now some authority to suggest that oral or 
148 
executory agreements to lease will be enforceable despite the fact 
that a formal lease is to be prepared by solicitors and executed by 
the parties. That such a result might be achieved is implicit in the 
judgement of Mahon 1 in Boutique Balmoral Ltd v Retail Holdings 
limited 149, a post Carruthers v Whitaker 150 decision. There the 
plaintiff had negotiated with the defendant to procure from the 
defendant a lease of shop premises . After stating the facts, the 
151 following passage in Mahon lis judgment appears: 
I find on the evidence Mr Staples and Mrs Ritchie came to an 
agreement on behalf of their respective companies that, in 
consideration of a payment by the plaintiff of $1,500 the 
defendant would procure a new lease from its own lessors in 
favour of the plaintiff for a term of five years ... with a right of 
renewal for five years at a rental of $36 per week for a period of 
two and a half years, with a review of the rent to operate as 
from that time. In addition, the plaintiff was to take over the 
existing fixtures the fixtures in question having been 
identified and agreed Mr Staples, in evidence, strongly 
denied that any agreement had been reached and contended that 
the terms and conditions arising out of the negotiations were to 
147 Supra note 119 
148Section 2 of the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956 appl ies to 
all types of tenancies, with the exception of statutory tenancies. It 
will also apply to all contracts to enter into a lease of land Transfer 
land for a term of not less than three years which, by virtue of the 
land Transfer Act 1952 S115, are required to be in writing. For a 
discussion of the application of section 2 of the Contracts Enforcement 
Act 1956 to leases and agreements to lease, see Hinde McMorland and 
Sim "land law" Vol. 1 pp 449-452, Vol 2 pp 1017-1018. 
149 [1976] 2 N.Z.l.R. 222 
150 Supra note 119 
151 Supra note 149 
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be set forth in a formal written offer to be sent to the defendant 
by the plaintiff's solicitors. But I am satisfied on the evidence 
that a final oral agreement was made in the terms just referred to 
.•. Mr Staples and other directors of the defendant company are 
businessmen. They were all aware that an agreement of this kind 
needs to be in writing. They obviously considered that they 
would not be bound by the verbal arrangement until they had 
accepted the terms of the written offer to be conveyed by the 
plaintiff's solicitors. But there was in fact, as I have held, an 
oral agreement to procure the grant of the lease to the plaintiff 
in the terms already mentioned and I am satisfied that ... when 
the fixtures were identified, the oral agreement was complete. 
r n the Boutique Balmoral 152 case, no writing had passed 
between the parties. The plaintiff had sought, instead, to rely on 
acts of part performance which, in the end result, were found to be 
insufficient. It appears to have been accepted, however, that the 
oral contract was not subject to a condition precedent as to the 
execution of a formal agreement. The case also illustrates the point 
that there are situations in which the parties may be very well aware 
that agreements for the disposition of land are not enforceable in the 
absence of writing. They may well intend the preparation of a formal 
document precisely so as to satisfy the statutory requirements. In 
such a case the reference to the formal document will not operate as 
a condition precedent and provided there is a concluded oral contract 
as to all essential terms it may be enforced so long as some sufficient 
writing or acts of part performance are found to exist. Similarly in 
Rossiter v Miller 153 Lord Cairns L C regarded the plaintiff's 
stipulation that the purchaser should sign a formal contract as 
"obvious and natural" because until that point, there being no offer 
. 't' th h . b d 154 m wrl mg, e purc aser was m no way oun . The purchaser 
152Boutique Balmoral Ltd v Retail Holdings Ltd, supra note 149 
153(1878) 3 App. Cas. 1124 
154id 1132 
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knew and had agreed to all the terms to be incorporated in the formal 
document and the parties' agreement, therefore, was not to be in any 
way suspended unti I the formal document was prepared. That being 
the case, the fact that the purchaser had not signed the agreement 
could not avail him when there was other writing sufficient to satisfy 
the statute. 
I n a subsequent case, Coachman Properties Ltd v Panmure 
Video· Club Ltd 155, the defendant company had approached the 
plaintiff company with a view to obtaining an assignment of a lease of 
premises which were owned by the plaintiff. Negotiations took place 
between two directors of the respective companies, the plaintiff's 
director eventually agreeing that jf the plaintiff could obtain a 
surrender of the lease from the existing lessee, it would be prepared 
to grant a new lease to the defendant company, on specified terms, 
and on payment by the defendant company of $3,000 "key money". 
The defendant acceded to the plaintiff's terms and at the request of 
the director of the plaintiff company both directors executed a form 
headed "Memorandum of Agreement to Lease". The form contained all 
the essential terms of the parties' agreement but included a term liThe 
Lessees will enter into a formal lease with the Lessor to be prepared 
by the Lessor's solicitors at the cost of the Lessee. Such lease to be 
in the form usually adopted by the solicitor for the Lessorll. The 
defendant company paid over the "key moneyll but later decided not 
to proceed and thereafter stopped its cheque. The plaintiff, having 
since obtained a surrender of the lease from its current lessee, 
issued a bill writ in respect of the dishonoured cheque and the 
defendant company applied for leave to defend. 
155 [1984] 2 N.Z.L.R. 200 
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At the hearing the defendant submitted that, at best, the 
arrangement at which the parties had arrived was subject to the 
preparation and approval of a formal lease and, therefore, amounted 
to no more than "an agreement to agree ll • Prichard J acknowledged 
that where parties to an agreement contemplated the preparation of a 
formal document they might nevertheless intend that their contract 
should be binding from its inception or, alternatively, they might 
intend the preparation and execution of the formal document to 
operate as a condition. It was often difficult to decide into which 
category a given situation fell and especially so in the case of 
executory agreements to lease which by their very nature always 
contemplated performance by the subsequent execution of a lease 
which would contain other terms not explicitly set out in the document 
which the parties signed. However, Prichard J found that there was 
a I ine of cases 156 which supported the view that it was sufficient to 
constitute a binding agreement to lease if the terms of the lease 
(other than those set out in the executory agreement) could be 
determined by an objective test so that the Court could, if required, 
determine what provisions the lease should contain. He referred to 
the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Sweet and Maxwell Ltd 
v Universal News Services Ltd 157 where the executory agreement had 
provided that the parties should enter into a lease containing "such 
other covenants and conditions as shall be reasonably required by 
(the plaintiff company)lI. Pearson LJ had said of the clause: 158 
156Eaddie v Addison (1882) 52 L.J. Ch. 80; Chipperfield v 
Carter (1895) 72 L.T. 487; Tooth & Co. Ltd v Bryen (No.2) (1922) 
22 S.R. (N.S.W.) 541 
157[1964] 3 All E.R. 30 
158 id 42 
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A formula such as that used ... is a convenient and effective 
means of dealing with the position where the parties have agreed 
on the main points, but have not yet settled the details, and wish 
to make a binding agreement immediately. By using a formula 
such as this, introducing the objective test of reasonableness, the 
parties avoid making a mere agreement to agree, which would be 
unenforceable. 
Prichard J found that it was of course necessary to distinguish 
the cases cited from those in which the executory agreement leaves all 
the terms of the lease to be subsequently negotiated or uses words 
such as IIsubject toll a lease to be prepared. But in the present case 
the agreement contained no similar expression. Rather, it stated that 
the defendant "will execute a lease". The most important terms of 
the lease were set out in the agreement and the remainder were 
ascertainable by reference to the form usually adopted by the solicitor 
for the lessor who was named in the document. There was thus 
provided an objective test by which the Court could, jf necessary, 
determine the additional terms to be included. 
Finally, Prichard J considered the effect of the provision that 
the lease was to be approved by the lessee's solicitors. The cases 
already referred to indicated that such a term meant nothing more 
than that the solicitor should be satisfied that the lease contained the 
proper or usual conditions. It was analogous to "solicitor's approval" 
clauses found in agreements for sale and purchase of land which did 
not prevent the formation of a binding contract and were generally 
held to be subject to constraints. 
Coachman Properties Ltd v Panmure Video Club Ltd 159 was 
applied in the unreported decision of Tompkins J in Langdon v 
McAllister 160. There the plaintiff sought specific performance, 
159 Supra note 155 
160High Court, Auckland 26.7.85 (A 91/83) Tompkins J 
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in respect of an alleged agreement between the parties for a new 
lease of office premises to the plaintiff. Tompkins J approached the 
matter in a way which is found to differ slightly from the traditional 
. 161 162 Wtnn v Bull , Masters v Cameron analysis. He defined the 
issues for determination as: 
(1) Whether any agreement had been reached at the parties· 
discussions; 
(2) If so, whether that agreement was sufficiently precise to be 
enforceable; 
(3) If so, whether the parties intended to be bound by that 
agreement; 
(4) I f so, whether the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956 rendered 
the contract unenforceable. 
Tompkins J found that the parties had reached an oral 
agreement to lease (although not at the rental contended for by the 
plaintiff) which was sufficiently precise in its terms. The plaintiff, a 
firm of solicitors, had for some time previously occupied a part of the 
premises which were sublet to it by a firm of accountants which in 
turn leased the whole of the premises from the defendant. Apart 
from the terms expressly agreed, it was accepted by the parties that 
the lease itself should contain terms similar to those provided for in 
the lease formerly held by the accountants. These additional terms 
could, therefore, be ascertained on an objective test similar to that 
applied by Prichard J in Coachman Properties Ltd v Panmure Video 
Club Limited 163. Tompkins J found that both parties intended to be 
161(1877) 7 Ch.D. 29 
162(1954) 91 C.L.R. 353 
163Supra note 155 
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bound by the agreement they had reached although they were both 
aware that it would not be enforceable in the absence of a sufficient 
memorandum in writing. With reference to Carruthers v Whitaker 164 
and ConcordeEnterprises Ltd v Anthony Motors (HuH) Ltd 165 , 
Tompkins J stated: 
I n ascertaining whether parties to an agreement to enter into a 
lease intend to be contractually bound, different considerations 
apply from a sale and purchase agreement. In the case of a 
lease, I do not consider that it would be considered common 
practice in New Zealand for parties not to be bound until a formal 
lease has been signed. On the contrary, it is commonplace for 
prospective landlords and tenants to enter into an agreement to 
lease on the basis that the important terms are agreed, and the 
balance of the terms are to be those normally inserted in leases of 
the kind involved. The parties then regard themselves as bound 
by the agreement they have reached. 
The plaintiff had rei ied on a series of letters which had passed 
between the parties as constituting a sufficient memorandum of the 
oral agreement, however, Tompkins J found that the correspondence 
failed to record a material term of the parties' agreement, in that it 
failed to refer to the plaintiff's right of renewal. There being no 
sufficient acts of part performance, the contract, in the final result, 
was held to be unenforceable. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
An Engl ish article 166 publ ished shortly after the decision in 
Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd 167 puts the proposition that Law 
v Jones 168 was entirely out of line with authority, not in finding that 
164 Supra note 119 
165 Supra note 120 
166Article (Anon.) (1975) 39 Conv. (N.S.) 229 
167 [1975] Ch. 146 
168[1974] Ch. 112 
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the letters relied upon constituted a sufficient memorandum, but in 
finding that a binding oral agreement existed at all. The author's 
contention is that both before and certainly after the decision in Law 
169 
v Jones , not only have there been occasions where the courts 
have, in effect, discerned the parties' contractual intent or lack of it 
from a perusal of subsequent correspondence passing between 
solicitors but they have also been prepared to find, in some 
instances, that the parties negotiated on a "subject to contract" basis 
although the formula itself appears never to have been actually used. 
The author takes the view that an analysis of many of the recent 
English decisions reveals that the courts have moved away from an 
objective determination of the parties intention and have treated a 
"subject to contract" qualification as having been implied. He 
concludes: 170 
that a new category should be added to the contract books under 
the old head: 'I ntention to Create Legal Relations'. Oral 
agreements for the sale of land, like social family and domestic 
arrangements and unlike other commercial matters, now call for 
the requisite intent to be proved, its absence seemingly being 
presumed. 
The author refers to a number of cases 171 in support of his 
proposition although lacking as they do any intrinsic cross-citation it 
is impossible to regard them as amounting to a line of authority. It 
must also be conceded that in many of the cases referred to, the 
"subject to contract" aspect was not directly in issue, however, the 
169
'bid 
170Supra note 166 at p.235 
171Smith v Mansi [1962] 3 All E.R. 857; Heywood v 
B.D.C. Properties Ltd [1963] 2 All E.R. 1063; Goldsmith (F) 
(SickJesmere) Ltd v Baxter [1970] Ch. 85; Beck v Box (1973) 231 
E. G. 1295; Jones v Morgan "The Times'r--r>ecem5e"r 11, 1973, 
Brightman J; Pateman v Pay (1974) 232 E.G. 457; Damm v Herrtage 
(1974) 234 E.G. 365. -
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implication, from the cases taken together, nevertheless appears 
plain. For present purposes it is perhaps sufficient to illustrate the 
argument by reference to passages from the judgment of 
Pennycuick V C 172 in Damm v Herrtage which is one of the most 
recent of the cases cited. The plaintiff relied on an oral contract as 
evidenced by a receipt and a series of correspondence which had 
passed between the parties' solicitors. The parties had not stipulated 
that the arrangement should be "subject to contract" and the formula 
did not appear in any of the documents relied on. In finding for the 
defendant it was nevertheless stated: 173 
A lay vendor and purchaser normally discuss terms in the 
expectation that if they reach agreement in principle, the terms 
will be incorporated in a written document with a number of other 
terms, and that they will not be contractually bound until that 
written document is signed. It is, of course, possible for them 
to bind themselves orally, and the purchaser may make it clear to 
the vendor that that is what he is proposing, but bearing in mind 
the normal practice in this connection, there is obviously room for 
misunderstanding, and worse, in this transaction at an oral 
interview from discussion to binding contract. 
The passage above quoted might well sound familiar as it 
appears to echo the sentiments expressed by Richmond J in 
Carruthers v Whitaker 174 when he referred to the "ordinary 
inferences" to be drawn where parties instruct solicitors and have in 
mind a formal agreement. Carruthers v Whitaker 175 was decided 
shortly after the English Court of Appeal decision in Tiverton Estates 
Ltd v Wearwell Ltd 176 and it may be seen to reflect the Engl ish 
172(1974) 234 E.G. 365 
173 id 369 
174[1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 667 
175
rbid 
176 Supra note 167 
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attitudes prevailing at the time. I n discussing the decision, the 
present writer has sought to point out that the Court of Appeal was 
necessarily required to determine the existence or otherwise of a 
"written contract", the possibility of a pre-existing oral contract 
having been expressly excluded by the factual finding of Wilson J at 
first instance with which the Court of Appeal never sought to 
disagree. Similarly, it is impossible to take issue with the Court of 
Appeal's finding in Concorde Enterprises Ltd v Anthony Motor (Hutt) 
Ltd 177 in which Carruthers v Whitaker 178 was affirmed, as a written 
contract and nothing but a written contract was expressly 
contemplated from start to fin ish. 
Taken at face value, however, Carruthers v Whitaker 179 is 
capable of a much wider interpretation. It is by no means universally 
accepted that the case is an authority on written contracts alone 180 
and it can be argued that the case establishes that the "ordinary 
inferences" will apply regardless of whether or not the parties could 
otherwise be said to have reached a pre-existing oral agreement. 
As against this wider interpretation of Carruthers v 
Whitaker 181 there remain the numerous authorities, of which the cases 
previously referred to are but a few, which make it clear that the 
mere fact that parties instruct sol icitors with a view to the 
preparation of a formal document does not of itself prevent the courts 
177 [1981] 2 N.Z.l.R. 385 
178Supra note 174 
179 Jbid 
180 E.q. P Blanchard "A Handbook on Agreements for Sale and 
Purchase of Land" (3d), 210; Hinde McMorland and Sim "Land Law" 
Vol. 2 p 992. 
181Supra note 174 
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from finding that the parties have concluded a binding agreement. 
At this point it is appropriate to refer to the most recent 
Privy Council decision in respect of statutory provisions equivalent to 
those contained in Section 2 of the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956, 
that of Elias v GeorgeSahely & Co (Barbados) Ltd 182, an appeal from 
a decision of the Court of Appeal in Barbados. There the parties 
had reached an oral agreement for the sale to the plaintiff of 
commercial premises owned by the defendant. The plaintiff's solicitor 
later wrote to the defendant's solicitor enclosing a cheque for the 
agreed deposit. The letter set forth all the terms of the oral bargain 
and requested the defendant's solicitor to hold the deposit as 
stakeholder "pending completion of the contract for sale" and to 
forward "the agreement for sale" to be signed by the plaintiff. The 
defendant's solicitor did not reply to the letter but forwarded to the 
plaintiff's solicitor a signed receipt in respect of the deposit. 
The trial judge found that the discussions which took place 
between the plaintiff and a director of the defendant company 
resulted in a concluded oral contract for the sale of the premises 
together with fixtures and fittings. Nothing had been left to further 
negotiation or agreement and as the plaintiff had leased the premises 
from the defendant company for the past fifteen years, there was no 
difficulty as to identification of the fixtures and fittings. The parties 
had arrived at an "open contractJl to which effect could be given 
upon the usual terms prevailing in Barbados. The judge rejected the 
defendant's argument that the letter showed that the arrangement was 
182[1982] 3 All E.R. 801 
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"subject to contract". The letter I as a matter of construction I could 
not be read as indicating that there was no binding agreement prior 
to the formal contract being drawn up and signed. 
Both the trial judge's findings were upheld by the Privy 
Council (Lord Scarman, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord 
Edmund-Davies, Lord Bridge of Harwich and Lord Brandon of 
Oakbrook). Lord Scarman, in delivering the Privy Council decision, 
held that the receipt signed by the defendant's solicitor could be read 
together with the letter from plaintiff's solicitor thereby providing a 
sufficient memorandum of the oral contract. 
h . d 183 emp aSlse : 
He expressly 
In seeking a sufficient memorandum it is not necessary to 
shoulder the further burden of searching for a written contract. 
Evidence is what the statute requires. For, as Steadman v 
Steadman ... emphasised, an oral contract for the sale of land is 
not void but only, in the absence of evidence in writing or part 
performance, unenforceable. 
Interestingly enough, the Privy Council in Elias v George 
Sahely & Co (Barbados) Ltd 184 made no reference to the requirement 
that the memorandum should also recognise the existence of a 
contract. The letter, however, was unequivocal in its terms. It 
referred to "the purchase ... from your client to (the plaintiff) II 
and contained nothing which could be said to detract from the 
existence of a concluded agreement. The facts in the case bear a 
strong resemblance to those in Bigg v Boyd Gibbins Ltd 185 where a 
similar decision was reached by the English Court of Appeal. 
183 id • 187 
184 Supra note 182 
185[1971] 2 All E.R. 185 
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In Carruthers v Whitaker 186, Richmond J placed considerable 
reliance on the IIsubject to contract" cases, however, it is important 
not to lose sight of the fact that there are fundamental differences 
between New Zealand and English conveyancing practices and that the 
IIsubject to contractU usage emerged in England to protect the 
purchaser from the risks of an open contract which there were 
infinitely greater. As a result, the formula in New Zealand is rarely, 
if ever, used. Moreover, its closest approximation in this country, 
the IIsol icitor's approval II clause is generally regarded as imposing a 
condition subsequent only and not as preventing the formation of a 
concluded contract187 . The strongest denunciation of the trend in 
New Zealand to draw analogies with the I1subject to contract ll decisions 
in cases arising under the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956, is found 
in the words of Prichard J in Coachman Properties Ltd v Panmure 
Video Club Ltd 188 where, after referring to the l1exchange of 
contracts" procedure in England and the customary practice of 
inserting the "subject to contract" formula in all correspondence 
189 leading up to the formal exchange, he stated: 
But in this country a different system prevails; contracts for sale 
and purchase are normally concluded at a much earlier stage in 
the negotiations with no more professional assistance than that 
provided by a real estate agent equipped with a form of contract 
approved by the Law Society and a selection of paste-on 
conditions for use a required. In consequence, it is common in 
this country. for an agreement to be expressly 'subject to 
solicitor's approval', but 'subject to contract' is virtually never 
used .... In determining the intention of the parties as it is to 
186Supra note 174 
187provost Development Ltd v Collingwood Towers Ltd [1980] 2 
N.Z.L.R. 205 
188[1984J 2 N.Z.L.R. 200 
189id 204 
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be gathered from the words of the instrument and the 
surrounding circumstances, the Engl ish jUdgments on 'subject to 
contract I are of no assistance. 'Subject to contract l is not a 
formula used in this country .... Nor are the New Zealand cases 
on 'subject to solicitor's approval' ..• directly in point. 
Those of the post Carruthers v Whitaker 190 decisions in 
New Zealand in which the ordinary inferences in a sale and purchase 
transaction have been seen to be rebutted lend strong support to the 
narrower interpretation of the decision. In both Newton King v 
Wilkinson 191 and the unreported case of Anae v Lambert 192 the court 
found in favour of a binding oral contract despite the fact that the 
preparation of a formal document was contemplated. In Newton King 
v Wilkinson 193, Beattie J expressly rejected the argument that the 
existence or otherwise of a prior oral contract was immaterial to the 
ratio in Carruthers v Whitaker 194. In his view, Carruthers v 
Whitaker195 had proceeded on the basis of a written contract and was 
not, therefore, an authority on a sufficient memorandum of an 
existing oral contract. 
As regards executory agreements to lease, Tompkins J in 
Langdon v McAllister 196 found that different considerations appl ied in 
so far as it was not common practice in New Zealand for parties to 
intend to be bound only on the execution of a formal lease, With 
respect, the distinction would appear somewhat illogical, particularly 
190 Supra note 174 
191 [1976] 2 N.Z.L.R. 321 
192 High Court, Auckland, 11.7.85 (A 1348/84), Hillyer J 
193 Supra note 191 
194 Supra note 174 
1951bid 
196 High Court, Auckland 26.7.85 (91/83) Tompkins J 
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in the case of commercial transactions. If the rationale is seen to be 
that the "other terms ll are to be those normally inserted in leases of 
the kind and, therefore, ascertainable by an objective test it is at 
least arguable that the same considerations should apply to oral 
agreements for the sale and purchase of residential property. There 
would normally be little difficulty in enforcing an open contract on 
the usual terms. Furthermore, the formal agreement usually 
contemplated would be none other than lithe form of contract approved 
by the Law Societyll. 
In the Australian case of Godecke v Kirwan 197, already 
discussed, the provision as to the giving of possession upon the 
IIsigning ... of a formal contract of sale" was held to amount to a 
condition subsequent, however, further on in the document there 
appeared a clause which stated "If required by the Vendorls I/we 
shall execute a further agreement ... containing the foregoing and 
such other covenants and conditions as they may reasonably require ll • 
Walsh J held that the clause did not in fact relate to a "second" or 
"separate" agreement and that its terms were consistent with the view 
which he had already expressed that the existence of a concluded 
contract was not itself conditional upon the signing of the formal 
document. A fter referring to cases dealing with executory 
agreements to lease, Walsh J concluded that the additional terms to be 
incorporated in the formal document were not, upon the true 
construction of the clause, to be left solely to the vendor's discretion 
but were to be "reasonable" in an objective sense so that in the case 
of dispute the matter could be determined by the court. 
197(1973) 129 C.L.R. 429 
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In the Canadian case of Bill Robbins Drilling Ltd v Sinclar 
Canada Oil Co 198, Moore J in the Alberta Supreme Court held that 
the parties had concluded a binding agreement for the drilling of 
certain oil wells by the plaintiff at the time the defendant accepted 
verbally the plaintiff's tender for the wells and despite the fact that 
the execution of a formal document was contemplated. Because of the 
time involved in relocating men and equipment, it was standard 
practice within the industry for contractors to act upon the verbal 
acceptance of their tenders. Furthermore, it was common ground that 
the terms to be included in the formal document should be none other 
than those comprised in the plaintiff's "bid sheet iJ and the defendant's 
"Master Drilling ContractU which had been forwarded to the plaintiff 
for its reference and the terms of which had already been approved. 
As yet there has been no subsequent case in New Zealand in 
which the unsigned agreement accompanied by solicitor's letter (the 
documents relied upon in Carruthers v Whitaker199 ) has been held to 
constitute a sufficient memorandum of a pre-existing oral contract 
although there would seem no reason in principle why the same 
considerations should not apply. The difficulty, however, that a 
plaintiff is likely to encounter in this sort of situation is not that an 
oral contract cannot be found to exist but that the memorandum 
cannot be seen to contain uan express or implied recognition that the 
contract has been entered intol!. 
In Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd200 , Lord Denning M R 
198(1973) 33 D.L.R. (3d) 701 
199 Supra note 174 
200 Supra note 167 
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said that Law v Jones 201 had flsounded an alarm bell in the offices of 
" 
't . the land fl202 . every so ICI or In This was so, because in Law v 
203 Jones it was held that the flsubject to contract ll stipulation 
normally inserted in all correspondence between solicitors could be 
impl iedly waived. The result of this was that where a party reached 
an arrangement which he did not intend to be binding or, put in 
another way, which he intended to be subject to a condition 
precedent as to the execution of a formal document, he might, 
nevertheless, find himself bound when his solicitor I in the course of 
proceeding with the transaction in the normal way and in preparing 
and forwarding a draft contract, inadvertently provided a sufficient 
memorandum thereby enabling the other party to seek enforcement. 
The solution to the solicitors' dilemna was provided in Tiverton 
Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd204 and its insistence that the memorandum 
must recognise or acknowledge the contract. Regardless of whether 
or not the analysis of the earlier authorities by the Court of Appeal 
in the Tiverton205 case is to be preferred to that of Buckley and Orr 
LJJ in Law v Jones206 , there remains the fact that the members of 
th C t f A I · th T' t 207 t I' fl d e our 0 ppea In e rver on case were s rong y In uence 
by considerations of pol icy and the flfarcical conduct l1 which might 
201 Supra note 168 
202 Supra note 167 at p 159 
203 Supra note 168 
204 Supra note 167 
205Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd, supra note 167 
206Supra note 168 
207Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd, supra note 167 
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otherwise 208 result . Once again, it can be argued that the 
209 difficulties presented by law v Jones pose less of a risk in 
New Zealand given the fact that here the "subject to contract" 
formula is neither needed nor used to the same extent and that 
different conveyancing practices apply. Be that as it may, however, 
the decision in Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd210 has since been 
consistently applied in England and will no doubt be appl ied in 
New Zealand211 also. 
Adhering to the principle that the memorandum must expressly 
or impliedly recognise the existence of the contract it nevertheless 
remains difficult to accept that it can and does have the effect that 
the parties intention is determined on the basis of correspondence 
passing between their solicitors and not on the words and conduct of 
the parties themselves. This is particularly so where the insertion of 
the "subject to contract" qualification is found to be unauthorised. 
I n law v Jones212 , Buckley lJ was at pains to point out that the 
parties "shook hands to indicate that a deal had been made" and 
there was no intention that the agreement should be "subject to 
contract". He found that while oral agreements for the sale of land 
were not common they certainly were not unknown and that: 213 
208 Supra note 167 at p 184 (per lord Denning M R) and at p 
188-189 (per Stamp l J) 
209 Supra note 168 
210 Supra note 167 
211 As it was in Newton King v Wilkinson, supra note 191 
212 Supra note 168 
213 Supra note 168 at p 213 
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Where laymen have entered into such an agreement it would be 
natural for them to expect that, when the matter had been put 
into the hands of their legal advisers, the contract would be 
given a more formal written embodiment. This is what appears to 
have happened in the present case. 
The view of the layman taken by Buckley LJ may be 
contrasted with that expressed by Pennycuick VC in Damm v 
Herrtage 214 referred to previously. It is perhaps best seen , as an 
example of the way in which judgments may often appear to be 
coloured by the nature of the transaction and the parties. In 
215 Damm v Herrtage , the vendor was the proverbial "Iittle old lady" 
allegedly induced to agree to sell her home while her husband, on 
whom she relied in all business matters, was seriously ill in hospital. 
Before leaving the matter of Law v Jones216 and Tiverton 
Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd217 it should be noted that several recent 
Irish decisions218 have shown a marked departure from the English 
trend both in holding that a defendant cannot shelter behind a 
"subject to contractU stipulation added after the bargain has been 
219 
struck and that the phrase is open to a process of construction 
214 Supra note 172 
215 Supra note 172 
216 Supra note 168 
217 Supra note 167 
218 R. W. Clark IISubject to Contract - 2 Irish Solutions" (1984) 
48 Conv. (N.S.) 251 
219 Casey v 'rish I ntercontinental Ban k [1979 J I. R. 364; 
Usitravel v Fryer unreported High Court (Ireland) judgment of 
Finlay J, delivered 29.10.73 (supra note 218 at p 254) 
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where a concluded agreement would otherwise appear to have been 
reached. 220 
On the basis of Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd221 it is 
evident that where a plaintiff in New Zealand relies on an unsigned 
agreement accompanied by correspondence, he must establish both the 
existence of a concluded oral contract and that the documents 
recognise the existence of that contract. Where such words as 
"proposed saleH and "draft contract" are used, they may be treated 
by the courts as equivocal or as pointing away from the existence of 
a concluded agreement. It is of course open to the parties' solicitors 
to state expressly that the matter remains in negotiation and is not 
binding until the agreement is signed. The fact that this is seldom 
done may indicate that disputes in this connection arise less 
frequently than might be thought or that in New Zealand it is indeed 
more common, at least so far as residential properties are concerned, 
for the formal agreement to be prepared by a party's real estate 
agent. 
Finally, perhaps the strongest argument against the wider 
interpretation of Carruthers v Whitaker222 , that the "ordinary 
inferences lf apply wherever preparation of a formal document is 
contemplated, is that taken to its logical conclusion it would lead to a 
presumption that parties always intend to be bound only upon 
execution of a formal agreement or that contracts for the sale of land 
220 Kelly v Park Hall School Ltd (1979) 113 I.L.T.R. 9; 
O'Flaherty--vArvan Pt unreported High Court (Ireland) judgment of 
McWilliam J, delivered 3.11.76, later reversed by the Supreme Court 
but on another point (supra note 218 at p 257). But cf. Mulhall v 
Haren [1981] I.R. 364 
221 Supra note 167 
222 Supra note 174 
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will not usually be enforceable unless they are written contracts. 
This is clearly contrary to both the express wording and the 
intention of the Act and would facilitate the fraud which the statute 
was designed to prevent. When a party to all outwards appearances 
manifests an intention to be bound and "shakes hands on the deal" he 
should not be permitted to resile from his obligations with impunity 
thereby defeating the other party's reasonable expectations. 
It is ironic to consider that in 1885 Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen J stated, with reference to the analogous provisions 
contained in section 17 of the Statute of Frauds 1677, "The cases in 
which a man of honour would condescend to avail himself of (the 
section), must, think, be very rare indeed.,,223 
The fact remains, however, that where a plaintiff seeks to rely 
upon an oral contract, or an informal "written ll contract, the courts 
will require cogent evidence of an intention to be bound and perhaps 
even more so in the light of the Court of Appeal decisions. The 
cases discussed would indicate that the requisite intent is more likely 
to be found in cases where the parties may be seen to have reached a 
comprehensive and detailed agreement as to terms. Strictly speaking, 
in such instances the courts' sphere of enquiry is confined to 
construing objectively the words which the parties have used and the 
need to resort to tlinference" is accordingly reduced. In other cases, 
relevant considerations would appear to be whether the parties have 
dealt closely with one another, as opposed to having dealt through 
intermediaries, and the extent to which parties have knowledge of the 
nature of the transaction and of the subject matter with which they 
are dealing. 
2231 L.Q.R. 1 
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PART TWO - THE AUTHENTICATED SIGNATURE FICTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 2 of the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956 provides that 
the contract or the memorandum thereof must be "signed by the party 
to be charged therewith or by some other person lawfully authorised 
by him". The requirement, therefore, is that the memorandum need 
only be signed by the defendant. 
I n his book "Statute of Frauds, Section Fou r, in the Light of 
its Judicial Interpretation", Dr James Williams has stated: 224 
A signature (giving the word its ordinary meaning) inscribed on 
a document serves the following purposes: 
(1) It indicates that the signatory by the very act of 
inscribing his name admits the authenticity of the document 
in question. In its particular reference to contracts under 
the Statute, this means that the signatory, by inscribing 
his name on the writing, manifests an intention that the 
writing shall be treated as a true exposition of the 
contract. 
(2) Being placed at the foot or more rarely at the head of the 
document, and outside the text, it performs this function 
with regard to the whole of the document. 
In the cases considered up until now, the writing in which the 
terms of the contract were contained had been signed by the 
defendant or an authorised agent (frequently a solicitor or a real 
estate agent) or else could be read together with another writing 
which had been so signed, the two documents together constituting 
the memorandum. The "authenticated signature fiction II , which will 
now be considered, was developed by the courts to meet the situation 
where no signature, in the normal sense in which the word is used, 
224J Williams "The Statute of Frauds, Section IV, in the Light 
of its Judicial Interpretation", 82 
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is found to exist. Once again it is difficult to express the rationale 
and effect of the fiction in clearer terms than those of Dr Williams;225 
A party may, of course, show quite convincingly by means other 
than signing that he recognises a writing as a true exposition of 
his contract. But the Statute says he must sign. Where, 
however, there has existed a writing setting forth the whole 
contract, and the party to be charged has clearly shown by his 
conduct that he recognises that writing to be a correct exposition 
of his contract, the courts have been loathe to allow such party 
to shelter under the Statute, and to meet such cases they have 
gradually developed what may be called the 'authenticated 
signature fiction'. Provided the writing contains the name or 
initials of the party, the courts are willing to hold that it is duly 
signed; but they must first be satisfied that the party has shown 
that he recognises the writing as truly expressing the contract. 
They then quite fictitiously restrict this general recognition to 
the name or initials and say that the party by recognising or 
"authenticating" his name or initials thereby converts such name 
or initials into a signature, and this signature authenticates the 
. writing. In this manner, justice is done without open violation of 
the words of the Statute. But although the courts have 
succeeded in enabling the first-mentioned function of a signature 
to be discharged by other means than a regular signing they 
have at all times been tender of the forms, and accordingly, even 
where there is no real signature, they continue to insist on the 
name (or in itials) being in such a pos ition in the writing that 
were it a genuine signature it would authenticate and apply to the 
whole of the writing. 
". STURT v MCINNES - THE THREE CRITERIA 
The requirements for the application of the authenticated 
signature fiction in New Zealand are commonly accepted to be those 
laid down by Wilson J in Sturt v Mclnnes226 . The facts in that case, 
as stated in the judgment, were that the plaintiff had entered into 
negotiations with the defendants, who were trustees of an estate, for 
the sale by the defendants to the plaintiff of a house property 
comprised in the estate. The parties agreed orally as to terms and 
the plaintiff then asked the defendants' real estate agent to prepare 
225 id 82-83 
226[1974] 1 N.Z.L.R. 729 
89 
an appropriate agreement. The agent did so, and the plaintiff 
upl if ted the agreement so that it could be signed by himself and his 
wife. It then being a Friday, he arranged with the agent to return 
the agreement the following Monday for execution by the defendants. 
Over the weekend, the defendants decided not to proceed with the 
sale. 
Wilson J held that the agreement not having been signed by 
the defendants, it was impossible for the plaintiff to succeed. He 
rejected the plaintiff's argument based on the authenticated signature 
fiction finding that the case law in England had established that the 
principle could only apply if three conditions were satisfied. These 
227 
were: 
(1) The contract, or a memorandum containing the terms of 
contract, must have been prepared by the party sought to 
be charged, or by his agent duly authorised in that 
behalf, and must have that party's name written or printed 
on it. 
(2) I t must be handed or sent by that party, or his 
authorised agent, to the other party for that other party 
to sign. 
(3) I t must be shown, either from the form of document or 
from the surrounding circumstances, that it [is] not 
intended to be signed by anyone other than the party to 
whom it is sent and that, when signed by him, it shall 
constitute a complete and binding contract between the 
parties. 
However, Wilson J went on to state that even if he were wrong 
in his findings with regard to the plaintiffls argument, there was a 
further reason why the case could not succeed, that being that lithe 
parties were never lad idem' on the sale"228 in so far as the 
227 id 733-734 
228 id 736 
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agreement was expressed to be "subject to finance ll , a term which had 
been neither discussed with nor approved by the defendants. 
Given Wilson Jls finding that the parties never in fact reached 
a consensus, it is submitted that as in Carruthers v Whitaker229 , the 
decision must be confined to the situations in which either there has 
been no prior agreement as to the terms contained in the formal 
document or the execution of the formal document is intended by the 
parties to act as a condition precedent to the formation of a concluded 
and binding agreement. Treated as such, the decision is entirely 
defensible as it is once again difficult to envisage that a "written 
contract" could be found to exist in the absence of the signatures of 
the parties or of the three conditions specified above. However, the 
present writer submits that Wilson Jls criteria are not appl icable to 
memoranda of pre-existing oral contracts and, moreover, that a 
contrary conclusion cannot be supported by the earlier authorities nor 
on a logical basis. The New Zealand cases which have followed in the 
wake of Sturt v Mcinnes230 serve to highlight the difficulties that 
failure to distinguish between oral and written contracts can produce. 
III. THE INTENTION OF THE SIGNATORY 
Leaving aside for the moment the question of the sufficiency of 
the signature and returning instead to more basic principles, it is 
fundamenta I to the a ppl ication of Section 2 of the Contracts 
Enforcement Act, 1956, and its predecessor, Section 4 of the Statute 
of Frauds, that the contract rei ied upon does not have to be a 
"written contract" and may be an oral contract so long as a sufficient 
memorandum 
229 [1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 667 230 Supra note 226 
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thereof is found to exist. Where a document is relied upon as 
constituting a written contract it must reveal as a matter of 
construction that the' parties thereto intended to be bound. But 
where there is already a concluded agreement, the memorandum relied 
upon does not have to be itself contractual and the intention on the 
f h h 't . . I . I 231 part 0 t ose w 0 prepare r IS entIre y Irre evant. 
If we now return to the case where the writing relied upon 
bears no "signature" in the normal sense, it is submitted that exactly 
the same principles should apply. Where a party seeks to establish a 
written contract, it is undoubtedly true that in the absence of 
signature "it must be shown, either from the form of the document or 
from the surrounding circumstances that the document is intended to 
constitute a complete and binding contract between the parties". 232 
I n the case of a written contract a signature serves not merely as an 
acknowledgement of the terms therein contained but also as a mark of 
assent to those terms. However, in the case of a post-contract 
memorandum which is not of itself contractual, it is superfluous to 
talk of the intention on the part of those by whom it was prepared. 
The memorandum must contain the names of the parties, the 
subject-matter, the consideration and the terms of the agreement but 
231 This is illustrated by the many cases in which writings 
have been held to be sufficient although it was clearly not intended 
by the signatory that the writing should operate as a memorandum of 
the contract or that it should satisfy the statutory requirements. In 
Re Hoyle, [1893] 1 Ch 84, 98, Lindley L. J. said of the memorandum 
lithe idea of agreement need not be present in the mind' of the person 
signing". In that case a recital in a will was held to constitute a 
sufficient memorandum. Other examples include Leroux v Brown 12 
C. B. 818 (a letter to a third party); Clerk v Wright 1 Atk. 12 (a 
letter to the defendant's own agent); Lucas v Dixon (1889) 22 Q. B. D. 
357 (an affidavit); Daniels v Trefusis [1914) 1 Ch. 788 (briefs of 
evdience); and Farr Smith & Co v Messers Ltd [1928] 1 K.B. 397 (a 
statement of defence in an earlier action). 
232Wilson Jls third criterion, Sturt v McInnes, supra note 226 
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the purpose of the signature is merely to authenticate, to ratify or to 
recognise the document as 'a true expression of the contract which it 
purports to record. 
Just as the intention of the party in preparing a post-contract 
memorandum is irrelevant, it is also unnecessary, in order that the 
authenticated signature fiction should apply that the printed name or 
initials should be intended to operate as a signature. In fact, the 
situation will invariably be the reverse. However, as Dr Williams 
points out233 , although the courts have moved away from a literal 
construction of the term "signature" they nevertheless insist on the 
printed name being placed in such a position that were it a genuine 
signature it would authenticate the whole of the document. I n this 
context the word "intention If still finds a place in the language of the 
judges. Where a party has shown by means other than signing that 
he recognises the writing as a true expression of the contract the 
element of fiction is introduced when, to preserve the outer shell of 
the statutory formality, the courts artificially restrict this recognition 
to the printed name or in itials. As it is said, therefore, that by 
recognising or authenticating his printed name or initials, a party 
converts such name or initials into a genuine signature so it is also 
said that the position of the printed name or initials must be such as 
to show that it was intended to govern and to apply to the whole of 
the writing. In the words of Dr Wilfiams: 234 
In actual fact, this talk of intention seems to be nothing more 
than the authenticated signature fiction in another dress. A 
name appears in the text of a writing that name lacks 
authenticating force; that is to say, it was not intended for a 
signature at all, but only to identify one of the contracting 
parties. When, therefore, the law attributes to that name an 
233 p 88 ante 
234 Supra note 224 at p. 99 
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authenticating power which in reality it never had or could have, 
it is the same thing as attributing to the party to be charged an 
intention that the name should be a signature. Just as the 
tradition of the signature which must of itself authenticate has 
left its traces on the language of the courts, so likewise do 
references to the necessity for the signature to be intended as 
such appear from time to time in judgments dealing with cases 
under the Statute. 
THE BASIS OF THE FICTION - THE EARLIER AUTHORITIES 
1. Written Offers and Informal Writings 
An examination of the earlier authorities reveals, it is 
submitted, that those cases in which the authenticated signature 
fiction has been found to apply, fall into only two categories - those 
in which the writing amounts to a contractual offer (which upon 
acceptance will suffice for the purposes of the statute as a II wr itten 
contract") and those in which the writing qualifies as a post-contract 
memorandum. That the fiction could have any application at all in 
situations where the writing is, in itself, the contract appears to 
have been considered only recently. Dr Williams 235 in his clear and 
thorough exposition of the topic would appear not to have averted to 
the possibility. In fact his definition of the term "signature ll has, it 
is submitted, direct application only to offers and post-contract 
memoranda, reference to the use of the signature for the purposes of 
signifying "assent" being completely lacking. 
Of the cases which illustrate the application of the 
authenticated signature fiction to writings which upon their 
construction amount to contractual offers, one of the earliest is the 
d .. . T t C' 236 t''/: ·f·./: f eCISlon In ourre v npps , an ac Ion lor speci IC perlormance 0 
235 Supra note 224 
236(1879) 48 L.J. Ch. 567 
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an agreement by the defendant, R l Cripps, to grant to the plaintiff 
a lease. The defendant had written to the plaintiff a letter 
containing an offer to '-ease and sufficiently stating the terms. The 
Jetter was not signed but had been handwritten on a sheet of 
notepaper headed "From Richard l Crippsll with his address. In 
giving judgment for the plaintiff, Hall V C stated that the principle 
had been shown to be: 237 
that when a party desiring to sell .•. sends to a party desiring 
to buy, a document containing the name of the former party, 
though it may be in print, yet in such a way as to show that the 
sender recognised it to be his own name, and the document 
contains the terms of a contract, that is a sufficient note in 
writing to charge the sender. 
A similar situation arose a few years later in Evans v 
Hoare 238 action for specific performance of contract of , an a 
employment. (A be performed within 239 contract not to a year. ) 
The plaintiff there was approached by an agent of h is employer, the 
defendant, who acting with the employer's authority presented to the 
plaintiff a document setting forth proposed terms for the plaintiff's 
future employment. The plaintiff approved the terms and then signed 
the document at the agent's request. The document was headed with 
the employer's printed name together with his address and continued 
in the following terms: 240 
Gentlemen - In consideration of your advancing my salary to the 
sum of 130 (pounds) per annum, I herely agree to continue my 
employment in your office for three years, from and commencing 
January 1, 1890, at a salary at the rate of 130 (pounds) per 
annum aforesaid payable monthly as hitherto. 
2371bid 
238[1892] 1 O.B. 593 
239Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677 
240 Supra note 238 
Yours obediently 
George E Evans 
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It was held that the employer, in instructing his agent to lay 
before the plaintiff the-document containing his name in full, had 
announced to the plaintiff that he was offering him certain terms if 
the plaintiff would accept them in writing. The Court had no 
difficulty in finding an intention on the part of the employer that the 
document should constitute a contract binding on both parties as soon 
as it was signed by the plaintiff. 
Schneider v Norris241, the case to which the emergence of the 
authenticated signature fiction is attributed can be seen, it is 
submitted, as a case in which the writing was found to be a 
memorandum of an existing contract. The case concerned an action 
for non-delivery of cotton yarn. It appears from the judgments that 
the plaintiff agreed to purchase the goods from the defendant who 
later sent to the plaintiff a bill of parcels, the form of which was 
similar to an invoice. At its head it contained the name of the 
defendant in print beside which had been written the name of the 
plaintiff as buyer and underneath a list of the articles sold with 
particulars quantity and prices. The Court of Kings Bench held that 
the defendant, by filling up the bill of parcels and inserting the name 
of the plaintiff as buyer, had shown that he recognised the document 
as an authentic expression of the contract and had ratified the sale to 
the plaintiff Lord Ellenborough CJ said: 242 
But here there is a signing by the party to be charged by words 
recognising the printed name as much as if he had subscribed his 
mark to it, which is strictly the meaning of signing, and by that 
the party has incorporated and avowed the thing printed to be 
his; and it is the same in substance, as if he had written Norris 
and Co with his own hand. He has by his handwriting in effect 
said, I acknowledge what I have written to be for the purpose of 
exhibiting my recognition of the written contract. 
241 (1814) 2 M & S 286 
242 id 288 
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243 A similar situation arose in Johnson v Dodgson . There the 
parties were both· hop merchants. The plaintiff's traveller, a 
Mr Morse, had called on the defendant with some hop samples and the 
defendant agreed to buy thirty-one 'pockets' of hops in accordance 
with the samples. The defendant then wrote a note in his sample 
book which he asked the plaintiff's traveller to sign. The note read: 
Leeds, 19th October, 1836 
Sold John Dodgson, 
27 pockets Playsted, 1836, Sussex, at 103s 
The bulk to answer the sample 
4 pockets Selme, Beckley's, at 95s 
Samples and invoice to be sent per Rockingham Coach. 
Payment in bankers' at two months. 
Signed for Johnson, Johnson & Co 
D Morse 
The defendant subsequently wrote to the plaintiff regarding 
arrangements for the delivery and collection of the hops but upon 
delivery he refused to accept them maintaining that they did not in 
fact comply with the samples. On this point the jury found for the 
plaintiff. 
The Court of Exchequer held that although there was some 
doubt as to the recogn ition of the contract by the letter, the note in 
the defendant's sample book was a sufficient memorandum to allow the 
contract to be enforced. As Parke B stated: 244 
Here the entry was written by the defendant himself, and 
required by him to be signed by the plaintiff's agent. That is 
amply sufficient to show that he meant it to be a memorandum of 
contract between the parties. 
As the note was written in the defendant's sample book, wh ich 
he retained in his own possession, it seems clear that it was never 
243(1837) 2 M & W 653 
244 id 660 
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intended to operate as a written contract, although it was meant no 
doubt to bind the defendant. 
A clearer illustration of the distinction made between the 
contract and the memorandum thereof appears in a series of auction 
245 
cases of which the first is the I rish decision in Dyas v Stafford . 
The defendant had authorised an auctioneer to offer for sale his 
property at auction. The plaintiff was the highest bidder and after 
the auction the auctioneer obtained the plaintiff's signature to a 
memorandum of agreement which was annexed to the particulars and 
conditions of sa/e. It commenced: 
I do hereby acknowledge that I have this day purchased from 
Mr Stafford, the vendor, by public auction, subject to this 
approval, the premises mentioned in the annexed particulars for 
the sum of .•.. subject to the conditions of sale .... 
The memorandum was not signed by either the auctioneer or 
the vendor and it in fact made no provision for such signature. 
However, the printed name of the vendor appeared not only in the 
memorandum but also in the annexed particulars of sale. The 
defendant subsequently refused to complete on the basis that the 
particulars of sale had contained a misdescription of the property and 
included a portion of land which the defendant had not wished to 
dispose of. 
Chatterton V C found in favour of the plaintiff and in so 
doing he clearly recognised that the writing itself did not need to be 
contractual: 246 
I n the case of sales by auction, the actual agreement is 
constituted by the bidding on the one part, and acceptance of it 
by the auctioneer on the other; and the writing necessary to 
satisfy the requirements of the statute is, therefore, a 
memorandum or note of the agreement so made. 
245(1881) 7 L.R. lr 590 
246 id 599 
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He went on to hold that the auctioneer was authorised to 
insert the vendor's name in both the particulars of sale and the 
memorandum of agreement and that the name was, therefore, to be 
regarded as it it had been written by the defendant himself. The 
name of the defendant inserted as vendor amounted to an admission 
by him that he had made the particular sale and that he had inserted 
his name to identify himself with the purchase by the plaintiff on the 
terms and conditions therein stated. Moreover, the signature, 
appearing at the beginning, was so placed as to relate and refer to 
every part of the instrument. The Vice Chancellor concluded: 247 
It seems to me to be no objection to this, that the primary object 
of the instrument may have been to bind the purchaser. If at 
the same time it amounts to a statement, under the signature of 
the vendor, of the fact and terms of the agreement, it is, in my 
opinion, a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the 
statute. 
The decision of the Vice Chancellor was reversed on appeal 248 
but not upon the basis that the printed name could not suffice as a 
signature. Instead the Court of Appeal held that the words "subject 
to (the vendor's) approval ll , contained in the memorandum, operated 
to prevent the transaction from amounting to more than an offer by 
the plaintiff to purchase the premises if the vendor chose to accept 
such offer within a reasonable time. In the words of Law C: 249 
There can be no real controversy as to the effect of the 
authorities I n all of them, however, the point for decision 
was, whether there was or was not a sufficient note in writing of 
the contract. But here, in my opinion, there was at the time no 
contract at all; everything was subject to the approval of the 
vendor. 
247 id 604 
248(1882) 9 L. R. Jr. 520 
249 id 324 
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In Cohen v Roche250 the plaintiff was the highest bidder for a 
lot consisting of antique furniture which was owned by the defendant 
who was also the auctioneer. Before the sale, the defendant had 
circulated a printed catalogue, the front page of which contained the 
statement "The South Kensington Auction Gallery, 147 A Fulham Road, 
S.W.3 Messrs Roche & Roche (G.W. Roche F.A.L.P.A. 
Proprietor) will sell at the above gallery on (the date and the time) 
300 lots of antiques and modern furniture •... " The other pages of 
the catalogue set forth the lots to be sold. At the time of the 
auction the defendant had in front of him an auctioneer's book 
consisting of large sheets of paper, on every page of which was 
pasted a leaf of the catalogue, a large ruled margin being left on 
either side; one of which was for the auctioneer's notes and the other 
for recording the price and the purchaser of each lot. The book did 
not contain the defendant's name but incorporated the front page of 
the printed catalogue. 
After the particular lot was knocked down to the plaintiff, the 
defendant wrote in the auctioneer's book against the lot the trade 
name of the plaintiff and the price for which the furniture had been 
sold. On the other side of the page he wrote "G.W.R. Re Walworth" 
"G. W. R." being the defendant's initials and liRe Walworth" indicating 
that he had himself acquired the furniture from the Walworth estate. 
In an action brought by the plaintiff under Section 4 of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1893 (the terms of which were equivalent to those 
contained in Section 17 of the Statute of Frauds, 1677) McCardie J 
held that the auctioneer's book contained a sufficient memorandum of 
the contract and that the defendant's printed name on the front page 
250[19271 1 K.B. 169 
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of the catalogue, which was incorporated in the book, constituted a 
sufficient signature within the statute. He stated: 251 
It is, of course, ~Iear that a printed name in the body of an 
instrument I in order to operate as a signature I must be 
authenticated by the person to be charged .... I n the case now 
before me there was ample authentication in that the defendant 
himself wrote down in his auctioneer's book the price realised by 
lot 145, and also entered the names of the purchasers. He thus 
recognised the bargain and his own printed signature. 
It would seem plain in this case that the auctioneer's "note" 
was never intended to operate as a IIcon tract" or to bind either 
party. It was intended purely as a "record" of the transaction to be 
retained by the auctioneer for his purposes alone. However I it also 
set forth all the relevant particulars of the transaction and the 
defendant, by his very act in recording, had recognised or 
authenticated the note as a correct expression of the contract wh ich 
was again concluded by the fall of the hammer. 
2. Formal Writings 
The application of the authenticated signature fiction, in the 
cases so far discussed, has been relatively straight forward. 
However, the situation becomes more complicated when the writing 
relied on is a formal document which by its very nature envisages 
and provides for signature by both parties. Here, it is submitted, it 
becomes crucial to distinguish between an oral and a written contract 
or, to put it in another way, between the contract itself and the 
memorandum thereof. Once again it is submitted that where there is 
already an existing contract, so that the writing is relied upon merely 
as a memorandum thereof, it is sufficient in the absence of signature, 
firstly, if the party to be charged has shown in some other way that 
251 id 176 
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he recognises the writing as correctly expressing the contract and, 
secondly, if the printed~ name appears in such a position that were it 
a genuine signature it would authenticate and apply to the whole of 
the document. 
One of the earl iest cases to consider the position where the 
writing relied on was a formal document was the decision of The 
Court of Common Pleas in Hubert v Treherne252 . The defendant was 
an unincorporated company which had accepted a tender from the 
plaintiff for the transportation of its coal. Draft articles of 
agreement were prepared by order of the directors of the company 
and a minute of a subsequent directors' meeting recorded that the 
agreement had been read and approved with a direction that a copy 
thereof be sent to the plaintiff. The agreement contained the names 
of the parties and the terms of a contract (which was not to be 
performed withi~ a year253 ) and concluded II As witness our hands". 
The agreement was not signed by either the plaintiff or the 
defendant. For some eighteen months the terms contained in the 
agreement were acted upon by both sides but then the company was 
able to arrange for the free transportation of its coal by its shipper 
and ceased to employ the plaintiff. 
The Court of Common Pleas held that there was no agreement 
which was binding within the statute. The names of the parties 
necessarily appeared in the body of the instrument which would 
otherwise be unintelligible and to hold that the mere introduction of 
the names of the parties was sufficient would be almost to repeal the 
252(1842) 3 Man. & C. 743 
253Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677 
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statute. The Court found that the form of the agreement which 
concluded "As witness our hands" clearly showed IIthat the names of 
the contracting parties were meant to be subscribed, and that it was 
not intended that the insertion of the names in the body of the 
instrument should operate by way of signature. 11 254 This agreement 
lIamounted to no more than if it had been said by A.B. that he 
'would' sign a particular paperll. 255 
256 In Hubert v Treherne the agreement had been signed by 
neither of the parties and it is difficult to discern from the judgments 
as to just how it came to be relied on by the plaintiff; Coltman J at 
one stage stating that it was not certain that the plaintiff had even 
seen it. 257 However, it would seem from the other judgments that 
the agreement, or at least its existence, was brought to the plaintiff's 
attention by the company's secretary but without the express 
authority of the directors. Nevertheless, all the judges appear to 
have recognised that had there in fact been some act of 
acknowledgement or recognition on the part of the directors, the 
result would not necessarily have been the same. In the words of 
Tindal C J "/ n th is case there is no sufficient original signature and 
th ' b t 't' II 258 ere IS no su sequen recognl Ion . Erskine J stated: III am 
not, however, prepared to say that if it had been shown that there 
was authority to give out the fair copy of the articles, the names 
254 252 Tindal C.J., at p. 753-754 Supra note per 
255 252 Maule J, at p 756 Supra note per 
256 Supra note 252 
257 Supra note 252 at p 754 
258 1bid 
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inserted at the commencement of the instrument, would not have been 
sufficient. 11 259 
Coltman and Maule J expressed similar sentiments as to the 
I k f t "d "d 260 ac 0 any ou Sl e eVI ence. 
The decision in Hubert v Treherne261 , it is submitted, is 
susceptible to at least two interpretations. The first is that of 
Dr Williams, already referred to, that when the courts speak of the 
Ifintention" of the parties in the matter of signature they are doing no 
more than re-emphasising, firstly, that a printed name wifl not suffice 
as a signature in the absence of some other recognition which the 
court accepts and, secondly, that because the fiction operates to 
convert the printed name into a genuine signature, the courts will 
insist that it be placed, not so as merely to make the writing 
intelligible, but so as to authenticate and govern the whole of the 
document. A second interpretation is expressed by O'Connor L J in 
Halley v O'Brien262 where, with reference to Hubert v Treherne263 , 
he stated: 264 
756 
I think these cases are explained by this: that there was no 
complete agreement at all; that there was, according to the 
intention of the parties, a locus poenitentiae, unless and until 
both parties signed; in truth, there was a memorandum of an 
offer, and not a memorandum of a contract. 
259 Supra note 252 at p 755 
260 Supra note 252 per Coltman J at p 754, per Maule J at p 
261 Supra note 252 
262[1920J 1 loR. 330 
263 Supra note 252 
264 Supra note 262 at p 341 
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265 Hubert v Treherne was cited with approval in Leeman v 
266 Stocks . The latter was once again an "auction II case, the 
defendant having instructed an auctioneer to offer his property for 
sale. By the time bidding was due to commence neither the defendant 
nor his solicitor had arrived and the auctioneer thereupon borrowed 
from another solicitor. present a printed form of agreement, which in 
fact was applicable to a sale by private treaty, in which he inserted 
the defendant's name as vendor together with the date fixed for 
completion. The plaintiff was ultimately the highest bidder for the 
property and the auctioneer then affixed a sixpenny stamp to the 
agreement and asked the plaintiff to place his signature across the 
stamp. The defendant expressed no dissatisfaction when he was told 
of the sale but subsequently he refused to complete. 
At the trial it was argued for the defendant that the 
authenticated signature fiction could not be invoked where, as in the 
instant case, the document in its own terms contemplated signature by 
both parties. However, this argument was rejected by Roxburgh J 
who stated: 267 
This is true if the document is regarded in isolation but it is 
equally certain that, when the auctioneer obtained the purchaser's 
signature thereto, neither the purchaser nor the auctioneer, 
acting on behalf of the vendor, ever intended any other signature 
to be added to that document. It was the intention both of the 
purchaser and of the vendor's agent, the auctioneer, that this 
should be the final record of the contract. 
Roxburgh J continued: 268 
265 Supra note 252 
266[1951] 1 All E.R. 1042 
267id 1047 
268 id 1048 
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I think there is no doubt that Hubert v Treherne is authority for 
the proposition that .,' while the form of agreement is a matter 
of such importance that, in the absence of any other evidence, a 
document in this form would not be held to be a sufficient 
memorandum to sati,sfy the Statute of Frauds, nevertheless, the 
fact that the document per se contemplated signature by both 
parties would not be treated as conclusive, or, indeed as 
paramount evidence of the fact that the signature of both parties 
was actually required, if tnere is evidence to the contrary which 
the Court accepts ",. It is open to the Court to investigate the 
circumstances to see whether the document came into being as a 
perfect agreement, and, if the Court on the evidence finds that it 
did then "., the Court is not prevented from so holding by any 
impediment in law, 
It would seem that Roxburgh J was not referred to the other 
auction cases in this context and, with respect, it is submitted that 
his consideration of the parties
" 
intention appears to have become 
somewhat confused. Once again, a contract was concluded by the fall 
of the hammer (and Roxburgh J expressly recognised that this was 
269) so , The auctioneer naturally knew that the contract would be 
unenforceable in the absence of writing and he stated in evidence 
that the had asked the plaintiff to sign the agreement "in order that 
(he) should be bound ll , However, given that a contract already 
existed it was unnecessary that the writing should be a "contractual 
document" or that in it the parties should have revealed an intention 
to be bound, The intention of the auctioneer in preparing the 
agreement (and for that matter, the intention of the plaintiff in 
signing it) were entirely irrelevant and the' requirements of the 
fiction were satisfied when the auctioneer recognised the document, 
which contained the defendant's printed name, as an authentic 
expression of the contract by presenting it to the plaintiff for him to 
sign, The printed name thereby having been converted into a 
genuine signature, it was in keeping with traditional expression, 
269 id 1047 
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albeit not strictly accurate, to consider whether the printed name was 
so placed as to show lIan intention that it should apply to the whole 
of the document Jl • On the basis of the earlier authorities, this 
requirement was satisfied by the printed name appearing at the head 
of the document. I n this context it is interesting to note that 
Roxburgh lis somewhat misleading reference to a "perfect agreement" 
appears to have been derived from the judgments in Hubert v 
Treherne270 . There the expression was used with reference to the 
writing in Saunderson v lackson271 which once again consisted of a 
"bill of parcels" which was prepared following an oral agreement for 
the sale and purchase of goods and in respect of which Lord Eldon 
Ch.l. stated "This bill of parcels, though not the contract itself, may 
amount to a note or memorandum of the contract within the meaning of 
the statute. ,,272 
A final reference is made to the I rish case of Halley v 
OIB" 273 h" h . t' Th ,/: t I I nen w IC was agam an auc Ion case. e lac s c ose y 
resembled those in Dyas v Stafford274 except that the IImemorandum 
of agreement ll annexed to the particulars and conditions of sale was 
not expressed to be "subject to approval" and made provision for the 
270Supra note 252 
271 (1800) 2 Bos. & P. 238 
272 id 239. The bill of parcels which contained the defendant's 
name in print was held to be a sufficient memorandum of the terms of 
the oral contract although it is difficult to discern from the reports 
whether the decision in fact involved the application of the 
authenticated signature fiction at all or whether it was found that the 
bill of parcels could be read with a letter from the defendant which 
contained a genuine signature. 
273Supra note 262 
274 Supra note 245 
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signature of the vendor or his agent. No such signature was affixed 
as a result of an oversight on the part of the defendant's solicitor. 
The Court of Appeal (Sir J Campbell C, Ronan & O'Connor LJJ) held 
that the "memorandum of the agreement", which contained the 
defendant's full name in prin( was sufficient to satisfy the statutory 
requirements. O'Connor LJ stated: 275 "Not always, r think, is it 
sufficiently remembered that the statute does not require the 
signature to be to the contract itself; it is sufficient if there is a 
signed note or memorandum of the contract. II 
O'Connor LJ then proceeded to outline the steps which the 
Court's enquiry should follow in a manner which, it is submitted, is 
. I I' . H . d 276 partlcu ar y mstructlve. e contmue : 
What I have said is so well settled as to be elementary; 
but I do think that a clear grasp of these elementary matters 
solves any difficulty that may arise. I now come to apply those 
considerations to the facts of this case. First, I ask myself was 
there a complete contract? There evidently was, for the contract 
was complete the moment the auctioneer's hammer fell. Second, is 
the document a memorandum of it? It obviously is, for it contains 
all the essential terms of the contract. Third, is the memorandum 
signed? The name of the vendor is in it; it is put there by the 
vendor's agent with the vendor's authority. It is true that it is 
not at the end of the document; but that as I have shown, is not 
essential. Does it authenticate the memorandum? It obviously 
does so, for I fail altogether to follow the argument that the 
signature is not a good signature because it was put to the 
document before the contract was completed. When the 
memorandum was filled up and given to the purchaser to sign, it 
was authenticated by the name of the vendor, then it it, quite as 
effectively as if it were put in afterwards. It is quite true that 
a more formal signature seems to have been intended; but it 
seems to me and it has been held that that does not affect 
the matter here there was an absolute contract, 
unenforceable under the statute, no doubt, for want of the 
proper evidence of it; the memorandum was of that contract, and 
for the reasons I have stated, the memorandum was sufficiently 
signed. 
275 Supra note 262 at p 1340 
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V. THE flORAllI AND THE "WRITTEN II CONTRACT 
In formulating the three criteria for the application of the 
277 
authenticated signature fiction, Wi Ison J in Sturt v Mel nnes placed 
substantial reliance on the early decision in Tourret v Cripps278, 
Evans v Hoare279 and Leeman v Stocks280 . As has been shown, in 
. 281 282 Tourret v CriPPS and Evans v Hoare the writing relied on in 
fact amounted to a contractual offer which revealed as a matter of 
construction an intention on the part of the defendant that the 
parties should be bound upon the plaintiff's acceptance. Leeman v 
Stocks283 was decided without reference to the earlier auction cases 
and although the decision itself is undoubtedly correct, Roxburgh J's 
reference to the parties' "intention II , particularly when viewed out of 
context and bearing in mind that the document was a post-contract 
memorandum appear, it is submitted, to be somewhat misleading. 
However, the fact remains that in view of Wilson J's finding, in Sturt 
v Mclnnes284 , that the formal document contained terms which had 
neither been discussed nor agreed previously, it was impossible to 
regard the document as a memorandum of an existing contract. If it 
were to take effect it could only do so as a written contract and it 
was difficult to infer that the parties should intend to be bound by 
277[1974J 1 N.Z.L.R. 729 
278(1879) 48 L.J. Ch. 567 
279[1892] Q.B. 593 
280[19511 All E.R. 1042 
281 Supra note 278 
282 Supra note 279 
283 Supra note 280 
284 Supra note 277 
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its terms in the absence of signature by them both. That the 
authenticated signature fiction was traditionally thought to have any 
application at all to "written contracts" is a proposition that remains 
doubtful at best. Although it is no doubt possible that parties might 
intend a document to operate ·as a written contract between them in 
the absence of signature (the situation postulated by Wilson J's third 
criterion) such a situation must indeed be rare. 
St t M I 285 't' . b' d t b d d ur v c nnes , I IS agam su mltte , mus e regar e 
as an authority on written contracts alone. Where there is a 
sufficient memorandum of an existing contract, the intention on the 
part of those who prepared it should be irrelevant and, in the 
absence of signature, it should be sufficient to establish that the 
party to be charged has by some other means shown that he 
recognises the document as a true expression of the contract. To 
say of a post-contract memorandum that "It must be shown ... that it 
(is) not intended to be signed by anyone other than the party to 
whom it is sent and that, when signed by him, it shall constitute a 
complete and binding contract between the parties"286 is clearly a 
contradiction in terms. Moreover, the earlier cases show that it is 
often equally unnecessary for the document to be "handed or sent by 
(the party to be charged), or his authorised agent, to the other 
t f th t th t · ,,287 par y or a 0 er party 0 sign • 
However, as has been discussed in the first part of this 
paper, the cases which pose the greatest difficulty in the application 
285
'bid 
286Wilson J's "third criterion", Sturt v Mcinnes, supra note 
277 
287Wilson J's "second criterion ll , Sturt v Mcinnes, supra note 
277 
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of Section 2 of the Contracts Enforcement Act, 1956 as a whole are 
those in which parties who have reached an oral agreement as to 
terms later instruct solicitors with a view to the preparation of a 
formal contract. Where parties have reached a concluded agreement 
and intend the terms thereof to be restated in a form which is fuller 
or more precise, but not different in effect, it is submitted that in 
the absence of the defendant1s signature to the formal document, the 
authenticated signature fiction can still operate so long as the 
defendant has in some other way recognised that he regards the 
document as a true expression of the parties l agreement. But within 
this context, it is again always open to the Court to find that the 
parties never intended to be bound other than by means of the formal 
document, the preparation and execution of which will therefore 
operate as a condition precedent to the formation of a concluded 
contract. 
VI. THE NEW ZEALAND CASES BEFORE AND AFTER 
STURT V MCINNES 
One of the earliest cases in New Zealand to apply the 
authenticated signature fiction was Bisland v Terry288, an action for 
specific performance of an oral agreement for the sale of a farm. 
Negotiations took place at the farm and it was agreed that the 
plaintiff would purchase the property from the defendants for a 
specified price, part of which the defendants were to leave in on 
second mortgage, the balance to be provided by a first mortgage in 
favour of the Rural Bank and the p/aintiff1s own cash contribution. 
288 [1972] N. Z. L. R. 43 
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Both parties instructed their solicitors and the defendants' solicitor 
prepared and forwarded to the plaintiff's solicitor a formal agreement 
for perusal. The plaintiff discussed the agreement with his solicitor 
when three points were found to require attention. The first was the 
basis upon which interest was~ to be charged on the second mortgage 
to be given back to the defendants, the second related to the rate at 
which capital repayments under the second mortgage were to be made, 
and the third related to the obtaining of consents to certain water 
rights affecting the property. 
The third point was resolved immediately when the plaintiff's 
solicitor telephoned the defendants' solicitor who agreed to the 
incorporation of an additional clause which became clause fourteen. 
The other points were not resolved but the plaintiff signed the 
agreement instructing his solicitor to retain it at least until the 
defendants had agreed to a reduced interest rate. The defendants 
later acceded to the plaintiff's request regarding the interest rate and 
the agreement was accordingly returned. The question of the rate of 
capital repayments was not resolved and neither was a further 
question which arose regarding the value of an irrigation plant and 
certain chattels which were included in the purchase price. The 
plaintiff later confirmed finance in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement but the defendants elected not to proceed with the sale. 
At the trial, Quilliam J found that the parties had reached a 
concluded oral agreement as to all essential terms by the time the 
defendants' solicitor forwarded the draft agreement for perusal. The 
agreement contained the defendants' full names and identified them as 
vendors and the plaintiff argued that the action of the defendants' 
solicitor, acting upon his client's instructions, in preparing the 
agreement for sale and purchase and in tendering it to the plaintiff's 
112 
solicitor amounted to a "sufficient signingll for the purposes of the 
Act. After referring to the earlier authorities289 , Quilliam J accepted 
this submission, stating;290 
In the present case, then, is there evidence that the agreement 
sent by (the defendants' solicitor) to (the plaintiff's solicitor) was 
to be regarded by the parties as complete in itself? I think it 
must be acknowledged that there is. As I have already held, by 
the time the agreement was forwarded to (the plaintiff's solicitor) 
all the terms had been agreed upon. The document did not 
accurately record that agreement with regard to the interest on 
the 2nd mortgage, but this was acknowledged to have been in 
error, and was rectified. The addition of cl. 14 was not made by 
(the defendants' solicitor) I but was agreed to by him. At the 
worst from the plaintiff's point of view it should be deleted. 
Quilliam J gave judgment for the plaintiff and granted the 
order sought. At the trial the plaintiff had also produced in 
evidence a receipt given by the defendants' solicitor for the deposit 
but Wilson J found that it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to rely on 
this because the agreement had been concluded and evidenced in 
writing before it was given. 
The decision in Sisland v Terry291 was cited with approval 
shortly afterwards in Short v Graeme Marsh Ltd292 . The plaintiff 
there had been negotiating for some time with a Mr Marsh, the 
director of the defendant farming company for the sale to him by the 
defendant of some thirty-eight acres of farm land which the plaintiff 
had occupied as a sharemilker for the past three years. The area of 
land in question was part of a larger area of land which Mr Marsh 
had subdivided. Mr Marsh's mortgage liabilities were such as to make 
289Scheider v Norris (1814) 2 M & S 286; Evans v Hoare 
[1892] 1 Q.B. 593 and Leeman v Stocks [1975] 1 All E.R. 1042 
290 Supra note 288 at p 50 
291 Supra note 288 
292 [1974] 1 N.Z.L.R. 722 
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it desirable for him to dispose of the thirty-eight acres and the other 
lots as closely in time as possible and he had therefore wished to 
defer the sale to the plaintiff until prospective purchasers for other 
parts of the land could be found. When it appeared that other 
sections would in fact be sold, the plaintiff again approached 
Mr Marsh and brought up the subject of the thirty-eight acres. 
They told each other who their solicitors were and then the 
defendant said 'Now this is unconditional'. The plaintiff said 
'Yes'. The defendant repeated his words and the plaintiff again 
agreed .. , and said he wanted to be in by 1 June, a crucial date 
in farming in the district. 
The price had been discussed and agreed previously and the 
plaintiff had already arranged his finance. Both parties saw their 
solicitors and Mr Marsh's solicitor wrote to the plaintiff's solicitor 
stating "We enclose an agreement for execution if in order. Will you 
please advise us whether your cI ient can make a declaration". The 
agreement contained the printed names of the parties at its head and 
was in standard form, however, on the last page there appeared the 
typed words "The vendor is not bound by this agreement until it has 
signed the same and the deposit has been paid", The plaintiff paid 
the deposit and signed the agreement and returned it to Mr Marsh's 
solicitor, however, before the agreement was executed by the 
defendant company it became apparent that one or more of the other 
sales would not take place and Mr Marsh refused to proceed. 
Haslam J found that the parties had reached a concluded oral 
agreement of which the draft agreement and the defendant's solicitor's 
letter provided a sufficient memorandum. He held that the words 
printed at the bottom of the draft contract could not be read as a 
denial of a pre-existing contract. They had been introduced without 
the plaintiff's authority and "At the very most, all I could read into 
those words would be something equivalent in effect to the term 
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'subject to contract' in the particular context in which it was 
canvassed and construed by their Lordships in the Court of Appeal in 
Enqland in Law v Jones ll293 • This was sufficient to dispose of the 
- --
case but Haslam J went on to state: 294 
If I were compelled to do'so, I should also be prepared to find 
that the typed words in this memorandum of agreement, 
'Graeme Marsh Ltd of Cambridge', appearing at the beginning and 
at the end of the form submitted, be sufficient signature to 
comply with the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956 and I rely again 
upon the principle· that was repeated in the Bisland case and 
treat those words as they appear in typescript as falling within 
the rule known as authenticated signature fiction. 
Haslam J's obiter comments, above, and the decision in Bisland 
T 295 h 'b h I' d v erry ave since een muc rna Igne . Wilson J in Sturt v 
Mclnnes296 said of Quilliam J's judgment in the Bisland297 case: 298 
He does not refer to any circumstances showing that it was 
intended that the contract would not be signed by the defendant. 
With respect, I think that when Roxburgh J ..•• referred to a 
document being a perfect agreement he meant that it was perfect 
without the vendor's signature. That conclusion appears 
inescapable from the extract from his judgment already quoted by 
me. If Quilliam J held otherwise I must respectfully disagree and 
decline to follow him in that regard. 
Wilson J found that, according to his researches, the 
B ' I d299 IS an case was the first ever to dispense with the IIthird 
condition ll and that this fact had not been drawn to the attention of 
293 id 727 
294
'bid 
295 Supra note 288 
296 Supra note 177 
297 Bisland v Terry supra note 288 
298 Supra note 277 at p 734-735 
299 Bisland v Terry supra note 288 
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Haslam J in Short v Graeme· March Ltd300 IIS0 that it is impossible to 
predicate that his assent to the decision in Bis/and v Terry was a 
considered oneil. 301 
Given the fact that in both Bisland v Terry302 and Short v 
M L 303 -Graeme arsh· td the document was a post-contract memorandum, 
the writer would again argue that whether or not lIit was intended 
that the contract would not be signed by the defendant" was beside 
the point. The objection to the Bisland304 case is, it is submitted, 
more in the finding that there was a concluded oral contract at all. 
Although it cannot be said that Quilliam J's finding in this regard was 
insupportable, it seems doubtful that a similar case would go the same 
way today. While there may have been agreement as to the essential 
terms there was clearly not with regard to the collateral ones and 
further negotiation with respect to these took place in the context of 
the formal agreement which was altered and amended accordingly. It 
would seem that a Court now faced with similar facts might well hold 
that the parties only intended to be bound upon the execution of the 
formal agreement by both parties. Th is would at any rate seem to 
have been the intention of the defendant when he specifically 
instructed his solicitor not to release the contract until further 
alterations had been agreed to. 
305 The facts in Bisland v Terry can be usefully contrasted 
300 Supra note 292 
301 Supra note 277 at p 735 
302 Supra note 288 
303 Supra note 292 
304Bisland v Terry supra note 288 
305 Supra note 288 
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with those appearing in Short v Graeme Marsh Ltd306 . In the latter 
307 
case as Haslam J stated: 
There were no other material terms to the bargain between these 
two. Parties, price, date of possession, and subject-matter of the 
contract were all agreed upon in a complete consensus. Because 
the plaintiff was himself in occupancy of this block as a 
sharemilker, there was no necessity for the customary covenants 
from a vendor about good husbandry ... 
Haslam J went on to point out308 "Let it be remembered at this 
juncture that it is common ground that a memorandum to satisfy the 
statute does not have to be itself a contractual document ll • 
However, Short 's
309 
case was decided prior to the decision of the 
English Court of Appeal in Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd31 0 
and in view of the stipulation typed at the bottom of the formal 
agreement it again seems clear that a similar result would not be 
ach ieved today. 
Sturt v Mel nnes311 was followed in Van der Veeken v Watsons 
Farm (Pukepoto) Ltd312 . Negotiations for the sale of farm property 
again took place between the plaintiff-purchaser and a Mr Watson, the 
director of the defendant company. The parties reached agreement as 
to price and other essential terms but the plaintiff later offered to 
pay an increased price if he could purchase the farm as a going 
concern. Mr Watson indicated that he would accept the specified 
306 Supra note 292 
307 Supra note 292 at p 725 
308 id 727 
309 Supra note 292 
310[19751 Ch 146 
311 Supra note 288 
312 [1974] 2 N.Z.L.R. 146 
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price and it was agreed that his real estate agent would prepare a 
formal agreement. When the plaintiff received the agreement by post 
it was accompanied by a letter from Mr Watson's agent advising that 
Mr Watson sought amendments to the agreement which it was 
suggested should be made ~ by the plaintiff's solicitor. The 
amendments sought included yet a further increase as to price and 
the remainder related to the price for stock, the purchase price of a 
rotary hoe, a smaller number of hay bales to pass on sale and a 
recommendation that the plaintiff should take a better tractor. The 
letter concluded: "Should you wish to discuss the contract, please 
call me. If we can get the documents to Mr Watson within the next 
10 days, I am sure he will stand by his word and sign up." 
At about the same time the real estate agent telephoned the 
plaintiff and suggested that the plaintiff might also I ike to amend the 
deposit clause so that only part of the deposit should be payable 
immediately and the balance some two months later. The plaintiff 
then consulted his solicitor who made the appropriate amendments and 
the plaintiff then signed the agreement which was returned to the 
real estate agent. Mr Watson subsequently refused to sign 
maintaining that he had not seen the agreement before it was 
forwarded to the plaintiff and had not agreed to the delayed payment 
of the deposit. 
I n an action by the plaintiff for specific performance, Beattie J 
found that it was not possible to read the agent's letter with the 
draft agreement because, on the evidence, the agent had not been 
authorised by the defendant to conclude a sale. If the plaintiff was 
to succeed he had therefore to rely on the authenticated signature 
fiction. It was not contended by the plaintiff that the parties had 
reached a concluded oral agreement and Beattie J found that this 
118 
immediately distinguished the case from Bisland v 
However, he went on to state that Quilliam J, in Bisland v 
had not _315 
Terry313. 
314 Terry , 
expressly posed the question of whether another signature was 
required in that case. _ If Bisland was decided on some basis 
other than a complete document, then, like Wilson J I 
respectfully disagree. I say this because Quilliam J makes no 
reference to the third criterion of Wilson J that it was intended 
that the contract would not be signed by the defendant. 
316 Beattie J affirmed that Sturt v Mcinnes correctly stated the 
principles for the application of the authenticated signature fiction 
and found 'that in the instant case, the plaintiff had failed to 
establish the third criterion. He concluded lilt is my opinion that 
neither side intended to contract otherwise than by the execution of 
the instrument by the parties to it". 317 
Once again, given the factual findings made by Beattie J, the 
decision in the Van der Veeken318 case is undoubtedly correct. It is 
possible, it is submitted, to view the decision in either of two ways -
either there was no oral agreement, in which case the formal 
document could only operate as a "written contract" or there was an 
oral agreement as to essential terms which was subject to a condition 
precedent that a formal document should be prepared and executed. 
If the true position was in fact the latter, then strictly speaking it 
was unnecessary to consider the provisions of Section 2 of the 
313 Supra note 288 
3141bid 
315 Supra note 312 at p 153 
316 Supra note 277 
317 Supra note 312 at p 154 
318Van der Veeken v Watsons Farm (Pukepoto) Ltd supra note 
312 
119 
Contracts Enforcement Act 1956, there being no IIcontract" on which 
the action could legitimately be brought. This point was emphasised 
in the decision of the High Court of Australia (Dixon C J, Williams, 
Webb, Fullagar and Taylor JJ) in Neill v Hewens319 (which was cited 
with approval in the Van derVeeken case320 ) where it was stated: 321 
At the threshold of this case lies the question whether any 
contract was in fact made. From the facts that have already been 
stated it seems to be perfectly clear that neither party entered 
into any anterior contract containing the terms and conditions 
expressed in the written contract. There was certainly no 
contract of which that document was intended only to be a 
subsequent note or memorandum. Neither side intended to 
contract· otherwise than by means of the very instrument. It is 
equally clear that when the written contract was drawn up by the 
solicitors and explained to the parties it was intended as an 
instrument to be converted into a contract by the execution by all 
parties thereto .... On the facts, therefore, the plaintiffs must 
fail on the simple ground that they are unable to establish the 
actual making by the defendants of the contract on which they 
sue ... As it denies the making of the contract, it leaves no 
room for the question whether the Statute of Frauds has been 
satisfied. 
That the courts are often seen to embark upon a consideration 
of the statutory requirements, and of the authenticated signature 
fiction, before determining if and at what point a contract can be· said 
to exist at all is illustrated, it is submitted, by the most recent 
322 New Zealand case on the topic, Van Eyk v Marshall. 
The defendants in the Van Eyk323 case were husband and wife 
and the registered proprietors, as tenants in common, of a farm 
property. On the same day that a separation agreement was drawn 
319(1953) 89 C.L.R. 1 
320Van der Veeken v Watsons Farm (Pukepoto) Ltd supra note 
312 
321 Supra note 319 at p.13 
322 1 N.Z.C.P.R. 537 
323Van Eyk v Marshall, Ibid 
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up between them, they entered into a conditional agreement for the 
sale of the farm to the plaintiff, however, the plaintiff was unable to 
satisfy the conditions by the due date and the agreement thereupon 
became void. Shortly afterwards, but while Mrs Marshall was 
overseas, a second agreem~nt was prepared subject only to the 
requirements of the Land Settlement Promotion and Land Acquisition 
Act 1952. This agreement provided for payment of a slightly higher 
deposit but the pruchase price remained unchanged. The second 
agreement was signed by the plaintiff and by Mr Marshall but on her 
return Mrs Marshal' refused to consent to the sale. 
The evidence given by Mrs Marshall, which the Court 
accepted, was that while she was overseas she had had second 
thoughts about the sale on the basis that when her son was older he 
might himself wish to carryon the farm. She was, therefore, 
relieved when she returned to New Zealand to find that the original 
sale to the plaintiff had fallen through. Bisson J was not prepared 
to find that Mrs Marshal I was aware of the new proposals, prior to 
the time at wh ich the second ag reement was prepa red, or that she 
had ever approved them. 
Given that the parties' original agreement had been avoided 
one might at this point be tempted to assume that Mrs Marshailis 
evidence had disposed of the matter. Not only had she refused to 
sign the second agreement, but more importantly she had also never 
approved of its terms. I n these circumstances, it is difficult to 
envisage how she could possibly have become bound by the second 
agreement, however, Bisson J went on to consider the provisions of 
the Contracts Enforcement Act, 1956 and in particular, whether it was 
possible for the plaintiff to succeed on the basis of the authenticated 
signature fiction. He found it was not. Having found that the 
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principles were correctly stated by Wilson J in Sturt v Mclnnes 324 he 
/ ----
concluded that judgment should be given for the defendants as the 
plaintiff had again failed to satisfy the third criterion. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
I n the latter part of this paper, the writer has sought to 
argue that the requirements for the authenticated signature fiction 
formulated in Sturt v Mclnnes325 are far from immutable and are 
inappl icable where the writing relied upon can be said to constitute a 
post-contract memorandum. The anomalies which are seen to appear 
in many of the decided cases arise, it is submitted, from an initial 
failure to determine the time at which and the manner in which 
parties in negotiation for the sale of land may have intended that 
each should be bound. This question presents particular difficulties 
where parties who have reached an oral agreement as to terms have 
also contemplated the preparation of a formal written agreement. 
Before the requirements of the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956 
can be considered, quite apart from the application of the 
authenticated signature fiction, it is essential that there be a 
"contract". Where there has been no agreement as to the terms 
contained in the formal document or where parties who have otherwise 
reached an agreement as to terms intend that they shall not be bound 
until the formal document is executed, the authenticated signature 
fiction cannot operate so as to charge a party when in fact no 
contract existed. 
324 Supra note 277 
325 1bid 
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Where, however, parties who have reached a concluded bargain 
intend the preparation of a written agreement purely as a matter of 
form, then as the cases discussed in the first part of this paper 
clearly indicate, the statutory requirements are satisfied, despite the 
fact that the formal agreement has not been signed, so long as there 
are other sufficient writings which bear the defendant's signature. 
Just as a letter or a receipt may be read with the written document, 
in its unexecuted form, there would seem to be no reason in principle 
why writings such as these should not equally suffice if they should 
contain in place of a genuine signature, the defendant's name in 
print. Logically, there should be no reason why the defendant's 
printed name appearing in the document itself cannot suffice although 
in these circumstances, and without more, it may prove difficult to 
establish that there has been on the part of the defendant a 
sufficient recognition or acknowledgement both that the contract has 
been made and that the formal document is an accurate expression of 
its terms. Whether in subsequent cases there can be found an 
opportunity to distinguish Sturt v Mclnnes326 is something that 
remains to be seen. 
326
'bid 
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